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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background and Purpose of the Research 
Debt financing is the predominant source of new external funds for firms (Cantillo and 
Wright 2000). Debt structure, defined as the choice between public and private (bank and non-
bank) debt. Although many studies have examined the traditional determinants of debt structure 
(such as firm size, age, profitability etc.), the issue of what factors drive the optimal debt 
structure choice is still controversial (Denis and Mihov 2003, Agarwal and Hauswald 2009, 
Rauh and Sufi 2010). Recently, there has been a lot of debate about the long-term stability of 
cross-sectional leverage, which defined as a firm’s current high or low leverage (relative to 
other firms) reliably predicts a comparable relative position in future cross-sections. Previous 
studies provide evidence or counter-evidence on debt stability (Lemmon, Robert and Zender 
(hereafter LRZ) 2008, Ito, Mikabe and Noma 2015 and DeAngelo and Roll 2015).  
Government play a crucial role in the process of debt financing. It is necessary to investigate 
the behavior or effect of public involvement during debt financing analysis. For example, 
according to Brandt and Li (2003), in China, private firms are more heavily borrowing from a 
commercial bank than state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Cull and Xu (2003) find that 
commercial bank tends to lend to more profitable SOEs than did the government, but this link 
grows weaker after the 1990s. However, these empirical studies on debt financing with public 
involvement only focus on big state-owned enterprises. Until now, there is no unified 
conclusion on debt structure and stability of firms, especially of SOEs. 
Many countries provide public guarantee programs to support small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs)’ debt financing (Beck, Klapper, and Mendoza 2010). There are many 
empirical studies focus on the relation between the use of credit guarantees and the ex-post 
characteristics of borrowers. However, research from the viewpoint of the lenders is less than 
borrowers.  
This paper analyzes firms’ debt financing with public involvement by focusing on both 
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borrowers and lenders’ behavior. For borrowers’ side, I analyze how Chinese listed firms 
especially SOEs choose their optimal debt structure and the long-term evolution of the leverage. 
For lenders’ side, the paper investigates whether and why the use of guaranteed loans differs 
across banks by using Japanese data at the firm-bank level.  
Historically, China’s financial system is bank-centric, Chinese commercial banks are state-
owned before 2003. SOEs have close ties to government and banks, and it is heavily involved 
by the public. However, from 2004, Chinese industry outgrown its need for this bank-centered 
system, traditional state-owned banks transferred into state holding share equity commercial 
bank. I predict that China’s banking reform will affect borrowers’ debt choice and long-term 
stability of their leverage.  
The results confirmed that firms’ state ownership is significantly negatively related to bank 
debt and positively related to non-bank private debt. The finding is inconsistent with previous 
studies and intuition. It suggests that, after China’s banking reform, firms’ state ownership 
cannot serve as a competitive advantage in financing from the bank. In contrast, funding is 
more easily for SOEs from non-bank private institutions. Regarding long-term stability, the 
results show that the leverage of SOEs is not as stable as non-SOEs, especially after China’s 
banking reform. 
On the other hand, on the side of the lenders, I analyze the usage of credit guarantees across 
banks. Japanese financial system is similar to Chinese: both of them are characterized by the 
bank-centered (Aoki, Patrick and Sheard 1994). The finding shows that there is a significant 
difference in the usage of credit guarantees across banks, and this difference stems from banks’ 
profitability and other non-financial factors. 
My research on the public involvement is based on many studies on determinants of debt 
structure, on the stability of debt structure, and on credit guarantees. Previous empirical studies 
on determinants of debt structure imply that firm size, profitability, asset tangibility, growth 
opportunity and state ownership involve negative aspects as well as positive aspects (Chen 2004, 
Tong and Green 2005, Huang and Song 2006, Bhabra Liu and Tirtiroglu 2008, Li, Yue and 
Zhao 2009, Chang, Chen and Liao 2014). 
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Also, empirical studies have mixed results of debt financing with public involvement. For 
example, Li, Yue and Zhao (2009) focus on SOEs, they show that state ownership is positively 
associated with leverage and firms’ access to long-term debt. The effect of non-SOEs (such as 
foreign ownership) is negative. Allen, Qian and Qian (2005) suggest that if non-SOEs be able 
to establish a reputation or connect with a bank with close relation, they can raise funding. Lu, 
Zhu and Zhang (2012) s’ finding consistent with the result, non-SOEs benefit from a bank, if 
they build economic bonds with banks.  
Regarding debt stability, the recent empirical studies (LRZ 2008, Ito, Mikabe and Noma 2015) 
find that the cross-sectional leverage of U.S. and Japanese firms exhibit long-term stability. 
However, DeAngelo and Roll (2015) provide counter-evidence that cross-sectional leverage 
changes frequently and dramatically. Thus, the question of stability of debt financing remains 
puzzled. Despite the empirical researches of long-term stability of cross-sectional leverage, 
there have been few theories in explaining the persistence in leverage ratios. 
There have been many empirical studies on public credit guarantee programs, most of them 
focus on whether or not the programs increase credit availability of potential borrowers, or fill 
the “funding gap” (Cowling 1998, Cowling and Mitchell 2003, Riding and Haines 2001, 
Cowling 2010, Riding, Madill, and Haines 2007, Zecchini and Ventura 2009, Boschi, Girardi, 
and Ventura 2014). And to examine whether the increased availability is efficient or not, or 
examine the ex post performance of the borrowers of guaranteed loans (Riding and Haines 2001, 
Boocock and Shariff 2005, Kang and Heshmati 2008, Oh, Lee, Heshmati, and Choi 2009, Craig, 
Jackson, and Thomson 2007, Brown and Earle 2017, Mullins and Toro 2017, and Lee 2018). 
There are few types of researches on the behavior of lenders, or how they use credit guarantees. 
1.2. Outline 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. 
Chapter 2 investigates the listed debt structure choice by using firms listed on the Small and 
Medium Enterprise Board in China from 2004 to 2016. Also, this chapter pays particular 
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attention to how public involvement affects firms’ debt financing, such as how firms’ state 
ownership affects their debt structure choice. In this chapter, I separate firms’ debt structure 
into bank debt, non-bank private debt and public debt. Private debt is the dominant component 
in China’s firm debt financing, and public debt is rarely used. 
The primary results show that there is a negative relationship between state-ownership and 
bank loans, which is inconsistent with the intuition and previous finding. And firm’s state-
ownership is positively related with non-bank private debt. If firms have the credit rating, they 
are more easily borrow from commercial banks and issue bonds in the public market, but firms’ 
credit rating negatively relates to non-bank private debt. Smaller firms tend to use more bank 
debt, and bigger firms tend to choose non-bank private debt and public debt. Firms’ age is 
significantly negatively related to public debt. 
In chapter 3, I test firms’ long-term debt stability by using data in the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange from 1994 to 2016. The findings add new evidence on the ongoing debate about 
long-term of leverage by using emerging economy’s database. This chapter finds that leverage 
of Chinese listed firms generates remarkable convergence and persistent stability. The 
regression analyses show that the firm’s initial leverage has a stronger impact on future leverage 
than traditional time-varying determinants of capital structure and the firm fixed effect is 
considered important. The results also find that both bank loans and trade debt drive the long-
term stability of total leverage. Leverage of non-SOEs exhibits long-term stability, but leverage 
of SOEs appears to show instable in the last several years. Nevertheless, in the initial years, 
leverage of SOEs exhibits long-term stability. 
Chapter 4 investigates whether or why the usage of credit guarantee differs across banks by 
using data at the firm-bank level from Japan. The results show that there is a significant 
difference in the ratio of guaranteed loans to total loans across banks. In particular, this section 
analyzes how banks’ financial indicators affect firms’ credit guarantee. The regression analysis 
reports that banks with lower profitability tend to use more guaranteed loans. However, the 
statistical significance is small. These findings imply that the difference in the usage of 
guaranteed loans across banks are partly due to their different financial conditions, but other 
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non-financial differences across banks matter more. 
Chapter 5 concludes that debt financing with public involvement by using the Chinese and 
Japanese database. On the side of the borrowers, firms’ ownership is an important factor in their 
debt structure, it significantly affects bank debt and non-bank private debt, but in the opposite 
direction. Both of SOEs and non-SOEs exhibit long-time stability, but this trend is more 
apparent for non-SOEs. To investigate the lenders’ side of debt financing, I analyze the behavior 
of banks by using Japanese survey data, the study finds as an important public instrument, the 
usage of credit guarantee is significant differences across banks, it partly stems from a 
difference in banks’ profitability.  
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2. Debt Structure Choice in Chinese Firms: Evidence from 
Listed SMEs 
2.1. Introduction 
This section aims to analyze debt structure choice for Chinese small and medium-sized firms 
(hereafter SMEs). For SMEs, debt financing is the predominant source of external funds (e.g., 
Cantillo and Wright 2000). Debt structure I defined here as the choice between public and 
private (intermediated) debt. For the firms, external debt financing comes from three primary 
sources: banks, non-bank private lenders, and public debts (Denis and Mihov 2003). Among 
these sources of debt financing, what factors drive the decision to determine its composition or 
the debt structure? This section tries to provide analysis on the determinants of debt structure 
choice in listed Chinese SMEs.  
There are a number of theoretical models (information asymmetry, renegotiation cost, and 
borrowers’ incentives) that predict the firm’s debt structure choices and many empirical studies 
examine these predictions (refer to Harris and Raviv 1991 for comprehensive review of 
theoretical studies and Denis and Mihov 2003, Agarwal and Hauswald 2009, Rauh and Sufi 
2010 for empirical analyses), detailed information were introduced in section 2.2. As the 
determinants of debt structure, these studies analyze variables such as credit quality, firm size, 
firm age, collateral, leverage and growth opportunities etc. However, the results are mixed, and 
the question of how firms choose optimal debt structure is still puzzling. 
Do these theories explain determinants of debt structure for firms in China? The debate is 
still immature for Chinese firms because little attention has been paid to their debt structure 
choice, especially for SMEs. A rare exception is Guo (2013)’s research on the relation between 
the debt structure choice and firm characteristics such as firm value, industry features, regional 
financial development and firm location. The results report that bank debt and non-bank private 
debt account for a significant proportion of debt structure, that firms which have debt credit 
rating are more easily raising funds, and that firm size and age is negatively related to bank 
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debt. However, the data used in this paper are from only one province’s survey for non-listed 
firms. In my analysis, I examine the debt structure of Chinese firms using more comprehensive 
data. 
Another uniqueness of this paper is its examination of state-owned firms in China. Recent 
studies of capital structure focus on state-ownership in China, but there is no uniform result. 
Huang and Song (2006) and Bhabra, Liu and Tirtiroglu (2008) report that the leverage of 
Chinese firms does not correlate with state-ownership. However, the other study reports 
inconsistent results, Li, Yue and Zhao (2009) finds that the leverage increases if firms are state-
owned. Thus, there is no consistent conclusion concerning the effect of state-ownership in 
Chinese firms, especially in SMEs. And there is no analysis on the impact of debt structure for 
state-owned SMEs. 
Behind this background, the study examines the relationship between debt structure and the 
firm characteristics for firms in China. Following the methodology of previous studies, this 
section uses the determinants of debt structure, credit rating, firm size, age, fixed assets and 
leverage, respectively, as proxies for information asymmetry, the ability of renegotiation, 
reputation, collateral and firm’s risk. The additional analysis adds the dummy variable to 
indicate the firm’s state- ownership which takes the value of 1 if the firm is state-owned SMEs 
or not. Also, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first empirical research on SMEs’ 
ownership after the reform of the Chinese financial system from 2004. 
The main finding in this part is that credit rating is significantly positively related to bank 
debt and public debt, negatively associated with non-bank private debt; firm size is significantly 
positively related to non-bank private debt and public debt, negatively related to bank debt; 
firm’s age is significantly negatively related to public debt. The obtained results demonstrate 
that several theoretical predictions are supported by these findings, specifically for information 
asymmetry, while others do not. 
The results of state-owned SMEs report that firm’s ownership is significantly negatively 
related to bank debt and positively related to non-bank private debt. The negative relationship 
between SOEs and commercial banks is inconsistent with the intuition and previous findings. 
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A possible explanation is that comes from the reform of the Chinese financial system in 2004, 
the “State Holding Share Equity Commercial Bank Reform”. After this reform, the debt 
structure of Chinese firms might have changed significantly, especially for state-owned SMEs. 
This paper attempts to contribute to the ongoing debate on the determinants of corporate debt 
structure by using the data of Chinese SMEs. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first 
analysis on debt structure of listed Chinese SMEs, and also the first use of credit rating and 
state-ownership in listed SMEs studying. The results show that both credit rating and state-
ownership are significantly affected SMEs’ debt choice. 
The rest of this part proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 reviews previous theoretical researches 
and empirical evidence, and proposes the hypotheses. Section 2.3 introduces the database and 
describes critical variables and the methodology. Section 2.4 reports the empirical results. 
Section 2.5 analyzes the capital structure of state-owned SMEs. Finally, section 2.6 concludes 
the study. 
2.2. Previously Researches and Hypotheses 
Section 2.2.1 previous theoretical explanations for debt structure, such as those focusing on 
information asymmetry, renegotiation cost and borrowers’ incentives. In section 2.2.2, I 
establish the hypotheses to test in this paper. Section 2.2.3 reviews some empirical analyses on 
debt structure. 
2.2.1. Theoretical research on debt structure 
Information asymmetry theory is an important theory of the firm’s debt choice.1 Because 
of asymmetric information, there are conflicts of interests among different stakeholders, such 
as internal shareholders, managers, employees, external creditors, customers and dealers’ 
                                                             
1 Myers (1984) argues that in corporate finance, information asymmetry refers to the notion that firm insiders, 
typically the managers, have better information than the rest of the market participants do on the value of their firm’s 
assets and investment opportunities. 
14 
 
association. Information asymmetry between the inside managers and outside investors 
increases the cost of financing for firms. Firms should choose optimal debt structure to reduce 
these costs.2 
Previous theoretical studies show the comparative advantage of financial intermediaries in 
information production under adverse selection. Leland and Pyle (1977) point out that because 
of economies of scale, financial intermediaries can produce information more efficiently than 
small individual investors. On the other hand, individual investors cannot directly observe the 
information that the financial intermediaries have provided, so the financial intermediaries do 
not have to worry about information spillover or "free rider" problem. Banks can reduce the 
inefficiency of the duplicated collection and processing of data in information production 
(Diamond 1984). Financial intermediaries have more information advantage, compare to the 
individual investors, especially concerning private information (Ramakrishnan and Thakor 
1984, Boyd and Prescott 1986). 
Monitoring cost is used to explain the ex-post asymmetric information problem or moral 
hazard. Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that most of the corporate bond holders are 
individual investors. Although each investor has an incentive and motivation to supervise the 
debtor, the abundance of investors creates the "free rider" problem, which makes them 
unwilling to pay costs for their supervision. This asymmetry between benefits and costs will 
significantly weaken the power of the monitoring by dispersed bondholders. Thus, the 
effectiveness of public debt financing in corporate supervision is limited, and private lenders 
have stronger incentives or greater ability to monitor borrowers than public lenders.3 
Diamond (1991a) analyzes the conditions under which lenders will monitor a borrower. 
Enterprises will choose a bank loan financing that accompanies monitoring to establish a 
                                                             
2 Fama (1985) defines “internal debt” as a contract where the debt holder gets access to information from an 
organization’s decision process not otherwise publicly available, while “external debt” is defined as publicly traded 
debt where the debt holder relies on publicly available information. The contracting costs for “internal debt” such as 
bank loans are lower than that for “external debt” such as corporate bonds, especially for small firms. Thus, he 
predicts that larger firms have more willingness to use public debt rather than relying on private debt. 
3 Diamond (1984) demonstrates that banks can solve the monitoring problem by extensively diversifying their 
portfolio. Fama (1985) argues that banks have the comparative advantage in monitoring services. The comparative 
advantage can explain why borrowers are willing to pay higher interest rates on bank loans. 
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reputation in the early stage. As firms gradually develop the status, they will find it more 
advantageous to use bond financing with no monitoring costs. This consideration suggests that 
as firm grow up, debt choice will change. The very young firm has little reputation to lose if 
caught engaging in actions harmful to lenders, so bank monitoring does not provide the proper 
incentives to repay the loan. Thus, such a firm will get screened out and borrow elsewhere or 
not at all. The old firm may lose reputation if caught engaging in risky behavior, so monitoring 
by banks provides it with the correct incentives. The firm with high reputation restrains itself, 
even though they are unmonitored. These firms can issue bonds in public markets. 
Generally speaking, the problem of information asymmetry is more severe in small firms. 
These firms have a little credit history, and outside investors do not know the contract details. 
Also, this kind of firms cannot provide audited financial statements to outside investors. 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) find that bank debt is attractive because it can be 
renegotiated for good firms to avoid inefficient liquidation. Firms with a low likelihood of 
distress will choose public debt. Detragiache (1994) argues that both public and private debt 
contracts play a role in the optimal debt choice, because of different renegotiation costs. Public 
debt is more expensive and therefore reduces asset substitution problems. However, it may 
worsen the efficiency of liquidation. By using private debt, the firm can avoid inefficient 
liquidation.  
Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) show that borrowers have the incentives to take the right 
investments by bank’s screening and threatening to cut off credit. Rajan (1992) focuses on the 
resulting trade-off between project control and borrowers’ incentives to exert effort, and there 
is a fundamental trade-off between bank debt and arm’s-length debt. The paper establishes a 
theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information 
which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders. This paper 
emphasizes that bank loans may distort borrower’s incentives. It shows that “the inside bank 
has the greatest incentive to behave when the firm has high-quality future opportunities”, “a 
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firm with high-quality opportunities prefers to borrow from arm’s length markets for them.”4 
2.2.2. Hypotheses 
Information asymmetry theory predicts that the commercial banks and other private lenders 
have the comparative advantage in information production and monitoring efficiency than 
outside investors, because of their specialized knowledge of customers. Hence, firms with a 
higher information asymmetry will use bank and non-bank private debt, while firms with lower 
levels of information asymmetry will borrow publicly. According to Diamond (1991), there is 
a “life cycle” effect in borrowing. New firms borrow from commercial banks initially, and when 
the firm’s reputation has established, they will issue public instead. Rajan (1992) argues that 
the costs of bank financing are that banks have bargaining power over the firm’s profits, and 
explain why many firms forsake bank loan to borrow from the public. They predict that 
borrowers with high-quality resort to public debt, while medium-quality firms will use bank 
debt. And low-quality firms usually refused by the bank. Hence, these firms issue public debt.  
China is a bank-centred economy, while the bank loan is the most important source of debt 
for Chinese firms. Banks tend to lend relatively more to good firms, and they can screen the 
applicants. I use credit rate is a reasonable proxy for the firm’s quality and predict that firms 
with credit rating and a lower degree of asymmetric information will have the lower probability 
of default. These firms will borrow from banks and issue public debt. If the firms do not have 
the credit rating, the level of asymmetric information is higher. These firms are not able to 
borrow from the bank or public, and they only depend on non-bank private debt, such as trade 
debt, or some underground finance. 
Diamond (1991) predicts that small and young borrowers will borrow primarily from banks 
to establish the reputation. Once the status is found, the firm is more likely to finance from 
public debt sources. Also, the renegotiation to banks and non-bank private lenders is more 
flexible than public debt. The renegotiation costs of private debt are lower than public bonds. 
                                                             
4 See Rajan (1992) 
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Small firms will choose the bank or non-bank private debt, and big firms will issue public debt. 
Based on borrowers’ incentive theory, recall Rajan (1992) predict that bank will trade-off the 
benefit and monitoring cost for the low level of quality firms, these firms will be refused by 
commercial banks. Banks only have the incentive to lend to firms which have good growth 
opportunity. Risky firms, with the high level of probability of bankruptcy, will use more non-
bank private debt financing. 
According to Diamond (1991) and Rajan (1992), they show that firm’s debt structure depends 
on the borrower’s reputation, in my paper, I use firm’s credit rate to measure firm’s information 
asymmetry. Firm size is used as a proxy for the ability of renegotiation, and along with the 
firm’s age, they are used as proxies for firm’s quality and reputation in the marketplace. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with credit rating will rely more on bank debt and public debt, and 
less on non-bank private debt. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Firm’s size should be negatively related to bank debt and non-bank private 
debt, and positively related with public debt. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Firm’s age should be negatively related to bank debt and non-bank private 
debt, and positively related with public debt. 
2.2.3. Empirical research on debt structure 
The extant empirical studies of debt structure identify a set of potentially important 
determinants of debt in the past several decades. Some studies analyze the relationship between 
the firm’s reputation and debt structure or credit-quality and debt structure (refer to Rauh and 
Sufi 2010). And other researchers find that firm size is significantly related to debt structure 
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(refer to Hooks and Opler 1993, Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein 1994, and Houston and James 
1996). Other studies analyze the choice of public and private debt (Johnson 1997, Carey, et al. 
1998, Krishnaswami et al. 1999 and Denis and Mihov 2003). The previous finds on debt 
structure are mixed. 
Rauh and Sufi (2010) focus on how debt structure varies across firms with different credit-
quality by using 1889 rated firms from 1996 to 2006 for U.S. corporations. They find that debt 
heterogeneity has the first-order importance in firms’ capital structure, and the majority of firms 
simultaneously use bank and non-bank debt. The paper also examines debt structure across the 
credit-quality distribution. The results show that lower-credit-quality firms use more debt and 
less equity when firms move down, they replaced senior unsecured debt with secured bank debt 
and subordinated debt. 
Hooks and Opler (1993) examine the determinants of the fraction of bank borrowing to total 
borrowing between 1982 and 1987, they find that the most important determinant of bank debt 
is firm size. Smaller lenders borrow from the bank based on their collateralized asset. However, 
larger firms get credit to depend on the most intangible resources. And larger firms or firms 
with good growth opportunities use less bank debt, and these firms are more easily to access 
arms-length debt. Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994) find small firms rely more on bank debt. 
Their investments are more sensitive to fluctuations in the credit provided by the bank than 
large firms. Houston and James (1996) empirically examine the determinants of the mix of 
private and public debt using detailed information on the debt structure of 250 publicly traded 
firms over the ten-year period 1980 to 1990 in the U.S. The results are consistent with the view 
that banks specialize in lending to smaller, less risky firms. 
Johnson (1997) examine the relationship between corporate debt ownership structure and 
several firm characteristics by using COMPUSTAT firms for 1989. The paper finds public debt 
use is positively related to firm size, age, the fixed asset ratio, and leverage, and negatively 
related to earnings growth volatility. Carey, Post and Sharpe (1998) analyze a sample of 14,735 
loan agreements involving about 5,700 different U.S. business borrowers from the November 
1993. They find differences between the bank and private non-bank bank debt use is negatively 
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related to the market-to-book ratio, and positively to the fixed asset ratio and leverage, private 
non-bank debt use has relationships with these characteristics that are opposite in sign from 
those of bank debt.  
Krishnaswami, Spindt and Subramaniam (1999) empirically examine the factors of the debt 
choice by using data on privately placed and publicly issued debt for a sample of 297 publicly 
traded firms over the period 1987-1993. They find larger firms and firms with larger average 
issue sizes exploit the scale economies in issuance costs of public debt, and so have lower 
proportions of private debt, the firm with higher contracting costs have higher portions of 
private debt. They also find little evidence that firms with favorable private information about 
future profitability choose more private debt.  
Denis and Mihov (2003) analyze the determinants of choice among public debt, bank debt, 
and non-bank private debt using data from 1995-1996 for U.S. corporations. It provides 
evidence on the choice among these alternative sources of debt financing. This paper 
distinguishes between the bank and non-bank private debt. It shows that non-bank private debt 
is an economically important financing source. The results provide the primary determinant of 
the debt source is the credit quality of the issuer. They find that firms with the highest credit 
quality exhibit a strong preference for public debt, while firms with credit ratings towards the 
middle of the spectrum borrow more from banks, and those at the bottom of the credit rating 
spectrum borrow more from non-bank private sources. 
There are several analyses of debt structure focusing on SMEs. Agarwal and Hauswald (2009) 
use data on all applications to new SME loans from 2002 to 2003 to a large bank in the U.S. to 
analyze the comparative determinants of online (“arm’s-length”) and in-person (“inside”) credit 
transaction. The result indicates that differential information plays very different roles across 
debt structure. Public information drives online credit decisions and pricing whereas private 
interaction discloses personally and confidential information, and builds length and depth the 
relationship with banks. 
There are some empirical analyses of debt structure for Chinese firms. Li and Xiang (2012) 
analyze regional debt financing structure based on panel data of provinces from 1998 to 2009 
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in China. They distinguish developed and undeveloped regions based on the GDP. The results 
report that the more developed the regions, the more frequently corporate bonds are used. Also, 
corporate bonds are more sensitive to inflation than bank loans. Guo (2013) uses the data 
coming from the survey on SMEs in Zaozhuang city to analyze the efficiency of the 
government’s financial supporting. The results show that enhancing the development of 
guarantees, and perfect credit rating system is more effective than the direct governmental 
instrument, firms which have debt credit rating can more easily obtain financing, and that firm 
size and age is negatively related to bank debt.  
In summary, previous empirical studies analyze some determinants of the firm’s debt 
structure, and some of them focus on SMEs. However, there are no uniform results, the question 
of what factors affect a firm’s debt choice remain the debate. In particular, in China, recent 
studies only base on the survey of one or several provinces. There is no comprehensive research. 
This section proposes to fill this gap in the literature by analyzing the comparative determinants 
of list SMEs’ debt structure. This part also adds the state-ownership variable to investigate the 
effect of ownership on firms’ debt choice. 
2.3. Database and Methodology 
2.3.1. Database 
In this research, I evaluate the determinants of the SMEs’ debt structure by using a sample 
of 884 firms listed on the Small and Medium Enterprise Board (SME board in short) in the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange in China over the 2004 to 2016 period. Small and Medium 
Enterprise Board launched in June 2004, as the first step to constructing a Chinese multi-level 
capital market. Firms listed on this board are characterized by rapid revenue growth, high 
profitability and high technology. The board regarded as China’s NASDAQ. The SME board 
mainly services for small and medium-sized firms, making up for the shortcoming that smaller 
firms are unable to raise capital through the main board (Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange) temporarily. Corresponding to the Main Board in China, SME 
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board is a useful complement to it.  
All information obtained from the database of China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
(CSMAR), which founded in 2000. This database is the most extensive financial and economic 
information database in China that includes more than 60 types of the database covering the 
Chinese financial markets, industrial research, and national and regional economic statistics. 
After CSMAR signed with China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 2003, it also 
assembles the original data of firms’ balance sheet. CSMAR Solution (a web-based platform) 
charge online if user access through it and data can be easily retrieved. I also use the information 
of firms’ credit rating that is available from Bloomberg database. 
About the standard of SMEs in China, there is a precise definition based on “Notice on 
Printing and Issuing the Standard for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises” which was jointly 
issued by the Department of Industry and Information Technology in China in July 2011. It 
divided into three types: medium, small and micro enterprises, and they are classified based on 
the number of employees and sales, combined with industry characteristics. The complete 
classification is shown in Table 2-1. 
 
< Insert Table 2-1 here > 
 
In this study, I eliminate from the original 884 firms, observations with ST (Special 
Treatment, firms with two consecutive annual losses, 10 firms), and firms from financial 
industry (9 firms). This selection process results in a final sample of 865 firms in 15 industries 
and 6,589 firm-year observations. The number and the proportion of these listed SMEs for each 
sector described in Table 2-2.  
 
< Insert Table 2-2 here > 
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2.3.2. Definition and description of key variables 
2.3.2.1. Dependent variables 
There are three dependent variables in the analyses. Bank debt: the ratio of bank debt to total 
debt, non-bank private debt: the ratio of non-bank private debt to total debt, and public debt: 
the ratio of public debt to total debt. Bank debt consists of two main categories: (1) short-term 
bank debt, which is bank loans that the firms borrow with maturities equal to or shorter than 
one year; and (2) long-term bank debt, which is loans that the firms borrow from a bank or 
other financial institution with maturities of more than one year. Non-bank private debt consists 
of debt from non-bank intermediaries, notes payable, accounts payable, and advances from 
customers. The third type of debt is public debt, which is corporate bonds. 
2.3.2.2. Independent variables 
I select the following factors as the primary independent variables: (1) Credit rating 
dummy variable (CreditD), which takes the value of 1 if the firm has the credit rating, and 0 
otherwise. This variable is a proxy for information asymmetry. In our sample, there are 1,192 
observations with credit rating, which are likely to be much more transparent than those without 
credit. (2) Firm size (SIZE), which is measured by the total assets. When I regress debt structure 
on firm size, I use the value of the natural logarithm of the total assets. (3) Firm age (AGE), 
which the years of listed firms. Firm size as a proxy for the ability of renegotiation, and along 
with firm’s age, they are used as proxies for firm’s quality and reputation in the marketplace. 
2.3.2.3. Control variables 
These factors select as the control variables by following previously empirical researches. 
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(1) Fixed assets ratio, which is the fixed asset divided by the total asset. Fixed assets include 
net property, plant and equipment, which measure the firm’s collateral value of assets. The 
collateral value of assets depends directly on the liquidation value of such assets. (2) Leverage 
ratio, total debt divided by total assets, is introduced to measure firms’ risk. (3) ROA, net 
income divided by average total assets, which is an important variable that affects the 
performance of the firm. In general, the better the firm's profitability, the higher the value of 
the firm. Table 2-3 summarizes the definition of all variables. 
 
< Insert Table 2-3 here > 
2.3.3. Basic statistics 
Column (1) of table 2-4 reports basic statistics for variables I use in this part. The sample 
consists of 865 listed SMEs from 15 industries from 2004 to 2016. As for the dependent 
variables, the mean value of non-bank private debt for Chinese SMEs is 0.671 as a ratio of total 
debt, and dominate debt structure. Bank debt account for 0.310 of total debt. Public debt has a 
significantly small portion of the total debt, accounting for only 0.026 as a ratio to total debt. 
The average age of listed SMEs is less than 5 years (the mean value of age account for 4.378), 
and I also observe that the average leverage is 0.360. 
 
< Insert Table 2-4 here > 
 
Because credit rating is a critical measure of the transparency of the firms, it is interesting to 
compare firms with and without credit rating. In this vein, I separate the observations into those 
with and without the rating. Column (2) and (3) of table 2-4 shows sample summary statistics 
on the variables for these observations. There are 724 firms and 5,397 without rating 
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observations and 141 firms and 1,192 with rating observations.  
For both of them, non-bank private debt is the dominant component of debt structure, with 
the mean value of 0.696 for unrated firms and 0.569 for rated firms, respectively. However, 
unrated firms use more non-bank private debt than rated firms. Rated firms use more bank debt 
and public debt, with the mean value of 0.386 and 0.049, respectively. 5 
The rated firms are larger and older (slightly) than unrated firms, and the fixed assets and 
leverage of rated firms are also larger than unrated firms: fixed assets comprise of 23.9% and 
47.0% of the total asset for rated and unrated firms, respectively, and the mean leverage is 21.8% 
and 33.5%, respectively. Profitability is smaller than 0.1 for both of them. 
2.3.4. Methodology 
I examine the relation between debt structure choice and firms’ characteristics by running the 
OLS regression of the following form: 
 
(2-1) Bank Debti = α0 + α1﹒CreditDi + α2﹒Sizei + α3﹒Agei + α4﹒Fixed Assetsi + α5﹒
Leveragei + α6﹒ROAi + εi 
 
(2-2) Non-bank PrivateDebti = β0 + β1﹒CreditDi + β2﹒Sizei + β3﹒Agei + β4﹒Fixed Assetsi 
+ β5﹒Leveragei + β6﹒ROAi + εi 
 
(2-3) Public Debti = γ0 + γ1﹒CreditDi + γ2﹒Sizei + γ3﹒Agei + γ4﹒Fixed Assetsi + γ5﹒
Leveragei + γ6﹒ROAi + εi 
 
                                                             
5 In China, the rules require firms maintain high credit rating (Aaa, Aa, A and Baa) produced by at least one credit 
rating agencies if they want to issue the public bond. However, CSFC (China Securities Regulatory Commission) 
does not have similar mandatory requirements for issuing convertible bonds by listed companies. Thus some 
unrated firms might have outstanding amount of convertible bonds. 
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The dependent variables are Bank Debt, Non-bank Private Debt and Public debt, which are 
defined above as the ratio to total debt. CreditD is the dummy variable, which takes the value 
of 1 if the firm has the credit rating, and 0 otherwise. Total assets, Size, a measure of firm size 
is the natural logarithm of total assets. Age is the number of years since first listed in the stock 
market. Fixed Assets is the ratio of the fixed asset to total asset and is a proxy for collateral 
value. Leverage measures the firm’s risk. ROA is a proxy for the firm’s profitability ratio, 
calculated with net income divided by total assets. 
2.4. Empirical Results and Analysis 
2.4.1. Test for hypotheses 
Table 2-5 reports the empirical results, where the results of the regressions on the three types 
of debt, bank debt, non-bank private debt and public debt, are presented in the three columns. 
 
< Insert Table 2-5 here > 
 
The results show that credit rating is positively related to bank and public debt, negatively 
related to non-bank private debt, and the coefficients are all statistically significant. The results 
are also consistent with Diamond (1991) shows that good firms issue public debt, and firms 
with the medium quality borrow from the bank. The findings indicate that if the firm exists 
severe information asymmetry, it only can rely on other channels of debt financing, such as its 
stakeholders like suppliers or customers or underground finance. If the firm has the credit rating, 
the transparency of the firm will increase, which makes it easier to finance from the public 
market. 
The results partly support hypothesis 2. The findings show that bank debt is negatively 
related to firm size, and the coefficient is statistically significant. It consistent with Hooks and 
Opler (1993) and Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994) s’ finding that larger firms or firms with 
good growth opportunities use less bank debt, and these firms can more easily to access arms-
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length debt, and small firms rely more on bank debt. Private borrowing is less beneficial for 
larger firms because their transaction accounts are typically spread over a greater number of 
banks than small firms’ accounts, and thus provide less useful information to banks. Firms’ 
smaller scale, backward and the lack of human resources lead them a disadvantaged status in 
the financial markets, and they will face more difficulty in borrowing from the public.  
The positive and statistically significant coefficient of firm size in the public debt regression 
is consistent with Fama’s (1985) arguments that larger firms borrow public debt rather than rely 
on private debt. This result is also consistent with Johnson’s (1997) arguments that firms use 
more public debt if they face lower information and monitoring costs. 
The results of table 2-5 show that firms’ age is positively related to bank debt, and negatively 
related to non-bank private debt, but the coefficients are not statistically significant. And firms’ 
age is significant negatively relate to public debt,  
2.4.2. Other findings 
There are some other results in table 2-5. Column (1) shows there is a positive and 
statistically significant correlation between fixed asset ratio and bank debt, which implies that 
collateral is an important determinant when the firm apply for bank financing. The finding of 
this correlation is in line with some previously researches: a significant positive relationship 
between the rate of capital expenditure (in fixed plant and equipment) and the level of 
borrowing (Long and Malitz 1985). The positive relation between bank debt and leverage is 
consistent with a finding in Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991), which argues that highly 
leveraged firms require bank monitoring. And there is a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between the firm’s profitability and bank debt, which is consistent with Chang’s 
(2014) arguments that fewer profit firms use more bank debt.  
Column (2) presents the results on other determinants of non-bank private debt. The results 
show that fixed assets and leverage negatively related to non-bank private debt. It denotes that 
when a firm owns more tangible assets or improves its ability to risk, it tends to finance through 
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sources other than non-bank debt. That might be because compared to non-bank private debt, 
bank debt is more stable and less costly, not only regarding the interest rate but also of other 
terms of borrowing such as collateral requirement. Profitability is significantly related to the 
non-bank private debt; the coefficient is positive. 
Column (3) presents the results on the determinants of public debt. Public debt is positively 
related to credit rating, firm size and leverage, and negatively related to firms’ age, and all the 
coefficients are statistically significant. These results are partly consistent with Johnson’s (1997) 
arguments that firms use more public debt if they face more significant information asymmetry. 
2.5. Analysis on Capital Structure of State-owned SMEs 
2.5.1. Previous research 
 State-ownership dominates the Chinese firms. Most large listed firms are SOEs. The state 
maintains its controlling power through equity holdings in SOEs directly or indirectly after 
listing (Sun and Tong 2003). The definition of state-owned enterprises is according to “State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council on the 
implementation of the Provisional Regulations for the management of the logo of the state-
owned shareholders of the listed companies”. State-owned enterprises are owned by 
government agencies, departments, public institutions, or wholly state-funded enterprises, with 
these units’ shareholding equal to or more than 50%. 
Moreover, in China, several large state-controlled banks dominate the financial system. The 
presence of the state as a shareholder for listed SOEs provides them with implicit loan 
guarantees and lowers the cost of firms’ financial distress. The government can apply pressure 
to banks to supply loans to SOEs even if it is detrimental to the banks’ interests. 
Cull and Xu (2003) compares how the government and the state-owned banks allocated 
credit to SOEs in China from 1980 to 1994. They find that banks lend to more profitable SOEs 
in the 1980s, but during 1990s, the link between bank loans and SOEs’ profitability became 
weaker. A possible reason for this weakening might be the policy changing. After the 1990s, 
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state-owned banks become responsible for their profits and losses. 
Brandt and Li (2003) empirical analyze bank discrimination against private firms in a 
transition country by using data obtained from a bank-firm survey that was carried out in 59 
townships (Chinese village, which smaller than the city) in 15 cities in the coastal provinces of 
Jiangsu and Zhejiang for the period between 1994 and 1997. The results show that local 
township government-owned enterprises (TEs) receive four times as much as bank credit in 
1994 as private enterprises, and the differences persist through 1997. These findings suggest 
that bank managers may enjoy some other private benefits by maintaining good relationships 
with the governments, e.g., local officials can use their political power to help arrange a job for 
a bank manager’s relatives or facilitate entry into the Communist Party. 
Motivated by these studies, I extend the analysis in the previous sections to examine whether 
there is any difference in debt structure between SOEs and non-SOEs. My study differs from 
these studies in several respects. First, the previous studies only use data for large listed firms, 
while I focus on small and medium enterprises. There is no analysis of the debt structure of 
state-owned SMEs, and I try to fill this gap. Second, there was a significant change in the 
Chinese financial system in 2004, the State Holding Share Equity Commercial Bank Reform. 
After this reform, the debt structure of Chinese firms might have changed significantly, 
especially for SOEs. Previous studies use data before 2004. This section uses the more recent 
dataset of listed SMEs from 1994 to 2016 to examine debt structure after the reform. 
2.5.2. Methodology 
I modify the regression models in the previous sections to the following form by adding a 
state-ownership variable. Following the approach in previous studies, I use the dummy variable 
OwnershipD, which takes the value of 1 if the firm is SOEs, and 0 otherwise. I identify state 
ownership using the standard of the CSMAR database. There are 328 state-owned enterprises 
in our sample. The regressions to estimates in this section are: 
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(2-4) Bank Debti = α0 + α1﹒CreditDi + α2﹒Sizei + α3﹒Agei + α4﹒Fixed Assetsi + α5﹒
Leveragei + α6﹒ROAi + α7﹒OwnershipD + εi 
 
(2-5) Non-bank Private Debti = β0 + β1﹒CreditDi + β2﹒Sizei + β3﹒Agei + β4﹒Fixed 
Assetsi + β5﹒Leveragei + β6﹒ROAi + β7﹒OwnershipD + εi 
 
(2-6) Public Debti = γ0 + γ1﹒CreditDi + γ2﹒Sizei + γ3﹒Agei + γ4﹒Fixed Assetsi + γ5﹒
Leveragei + γ6﹒ROAi + γ7﹒OwnershipD + εi 
 
2.5.3. Results 
Column (1) of Table 2-6 reports the result for bank debt. The results show that there is a 
negative and statistically significant relationship between state ownership and bank debt. In 
other words, SOEs are more heavily to finance from the commercial bank. The result is 
inconsistent with previous findings and our intuition. Intuitively, SOEs supported by the 
government, and they may obtain more resources from state-owned commercial banks. A 
possible explanation is that the firm’s debt choice is associated with the reform of the Chinese 
financial system. I will discuss this possibility in more details in the following part. 
 
< Insert Table 2-6 here > 
 
Column (2) reports the result for non-bank private debt. The result shows the coefficient for 
OwnershipD is positive and statistically significant, meaning that SOEs use more non-bank 
private debt, such as trade debt. It suggests that for SMEs that are owned by the government, 
borrowing from commercial debt or other stakeholders are easier than non-state-owned 
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enterprises. As we already confirmed, non-bank private debt is the essential fund resources in 
China, accounting for 60-70% of total debt (see Table 2-4). The determinants of non-bank 
private debt are more complicated than other debts because it might depend on the very close 
relationship between borrowers and lenders. For example, non-bank private debt includes trade 
credit (notes payable, accounts payable and advances from customers). The credit is provided 
based not only on the quality and competitive cost of the products and services but also mutual 
trust between the firm and its suppliers. Firms might be able to gain confidence through 
repeated cooperation or their ownership, so the result here might indicate that state-owned 
enterprises can get confidence, and more easily finance from their suppliers or stakeholders.  
Column (3) reports the results for public debt. The results show that the relationship between 
state-ownership and public debt is negative, but the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
Because of the small size, it is difficult for SMEs to issue the bond in public markets. Outside 
investors should pay closer attention to firm’s credit rating, size and debt-paying.  
2.5.4. Discussion 
This section discusses a possible reason for a seemingly counter-intuitive result of the 
negative relationship between state ownership and bank debt. The sample period from 1994 to 
2016 can divide into two periods regarding the reform of the Chinese finance market: “State 
Owned Bank Period”: from 1994 to 2003 and “State Holding Share Equity Commercial Bank 
Period”: from 2004 until 2016. This reform might have affected the debt structure of Chinese 
firms, especially SOEs. Wang, Wong and Xia (2008) investigate the impact of China’s banking 
reform on state-owned enterprises in bank lending by using listed state-owned enterprises’ 
financial information from 1999 to 2007. The result shows those SOEs can borrow new loans 
from commercial banks during the period 1999 to 2007 even if they are in financial distress or 
making losses but is more difficult especially after 2003. After state-owned commercial banks 
transferred into “state holding share equity commercial banks”, firms in financial distress face 
more heavily to obtain loans from banks.  
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The other explanation may be that the government intervened in state-owned enterprises. 
Manager in SOEs is “double-status”. On the one hand, she or he is in charge of business 
management. On the other, the manager is responsible for political tasks, such as supporting 
the local economy, education and others. Thus, state-owned banks may not be able to supervise 
and regulate state-owned firms’ effectively or independently. Although there is no sufficient 
evidence to support this guess, the findings in table 6 suggest that commercial bank prefer non-
state-owned enterprises.  
Non-bank private debt also includes other debt that the financial sheet gives us an ambiguous 
definition of this kind of debt. Some local researchers survey “underground banks” which are 
part of China’s thriving grey market. Many of the factories expand the scale by using money 
from underground banks, which exist in a legal grey area. It is tough to obtain financial 
information about debt from underground banks, but we can suspect that if firms are SOEs, it 
might be easier for them to borrow from the underground bank. 
2.6. Conclusion 
This section analyzes the determinants of firms’ debt structure using data from listed Chinese 
SMEs. The time window is from 2004 to 2016. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first 
research that examines the debt structure of Chinese SMEs.  
I first find that the debt structure of Chinese enterprises consists of a high proportion of bank 
and non-bank private debt, and the public debt is rare. The results also suggest that information 
and monitoring cost explains Chinese enterprises’ choice of bank debt. The credit rating 
positively affects firm’s bank and public debt, and significantly negatively related to non-bank 
private debt. Smaller firms usually choose bank debt, and rarely finance by public debt. Larger 
firms tend to use more non-bank private debt and public debt. This section finds that firm age 
not significantly affect firms’ private debt. The relationship between firm age and public debt 
is significantly negative. 
In the further study, I analyze the capital structure of state-owned firms. The results show 
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that firms’ ownership is an important determinant of the debt structure. Ownership significantly 
affects bank debt and non-bank private debt, but in the opposite direction, state ownership is 
negatively related to bank debt and positively related to non-bank private debt. One possible 
interpretation for this counterintuitive result is that after the shareholding reform of state-owned 
commercial banks in 2004. I also find that state-owned enterprises prefer non-bank private debt, 
which is presumably because relationships with the government might contribute to promoting 
borrowing from firms’ stakeholders. 
A shortcoming is this part is that I use leverage as an explanatory variable in regression 
analysis followed previous empirical studies. However, leverage is related to firm size, fixed 
assets and other firms’ characteristics, it may make endogenous problems. In the future, I will 
appropriate methodology to solve this problem.6 Another shortcoming of this part is its limited 
focus. Although this is the first study on the debt structure of listed SMEs in China, this section 
only analyzes less than 900 SMEs, which is a small portion of the vast number of total firms in 
China. The future broader research needs more detailed information about a more substantial 
amount of firms. Future research also needs to focus on the firm’s debt structure dynamics, to 
examine whether there exists long-term stability of corporate leverage among Chinese listed 
companies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
6 Johnson (1997) regress leverage on the other explanatory variables, such as firm size, and use the residuals from 
the regressions as an instrumental variable for leverage in the debt ownership regressions. 
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Table 2-1 Definition and Classification of SMEs in China 
This table summarizes the classifications of SMEs in China that is based on the statement “the 
medium-sized and small enterprises standard type” jointly issued by the Department of Industry 
and Information Technology in July 2011. 
Industry Number of Employees 
(Persons) 
Sales 
(Million RMB) 
Agriculture, Forestry, Hunting, Fishery N.A. 0.5-20 
Manufacturing 20-1000 3-400 
Construction NA 3-800 
Wholesale 5-200 10-400 
Retail Trades 10-300 1-200 
Transportation 20-1000 2-300 
Warehousing 20-200 1-300 
Hotel and Restaurant 10-300 1-100 
Note: N.A. stands for not applicable 
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Table 2-2 Broad Industry Distribution 
This table shows the number of Chinese listed SMEs by industry during the period from 1994 
to 2016. In the analysis I eliminate firms with ST (Special Treatment: firms with two 
consecutive annual losses, 10 firms) and firms in financial industry (9 firms). 
 
 
 
 
Full Sample 
Code Industry Count Percent 
A Agriculture, Forestry, Hunting, Fishery 16 1.85% 
B Mining and Quarrying 6 0.69% 
C Manufacturing 664 76.76% 
D Electricity, Gas and Water 8 0.92% 
E Construction 33 3.82% 
F Wholesale and Retail Trade 27 3.12% 
G Transportation, Warehousing 12 1.39% 
H Hotel and Restaurant 1 0.12% 
I Information Technology 52 6.01% 
J Real Estate 10 1.16% 
K Lease and Business Service 15 1.73% 
L Scientific Research and Technical Service 7 0.81% 
M Water conservancy, Environment and Public Facility Management 5 0.58% 
N Social Services 2 0.23% 
O Communication and Cultural 7 0.81% 
 Total 865 100.00% 
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Table 2-3 Definition of Variables 
This table describes the definition of the variables used in this paper. There are three dependent 
variables: bank debt, non-bank private debt and public debt. The main independent variables 
are Credit rating dummy variable (CreditD), firm size (SIZE) and firm age (AGE). The control 
variables are fixed assets ratio, leverage ratio and ROA. 
 
Variables  Definition 
Dependent Variables  
Bank Debt (Short term bank debt + long term bank debt) / total debt 
Non-bank Private Debt (Notes payable + accounts payable + advances from customers)/ total debt 
Public Debt Corporate bonds / total debt 
Independent Variables  
CreditD = 1 if the firm have credit rating, otherwise 0 
Size Total assets (book value) 
Age The number of years since the first listing at the stock market 
Control Variables  
Fixed Assets (Property + plant + equipment)/ total assets 
Leverage Total debt / total assets 
ROA Net income/ total assets 
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Table 2-4 Sample Summary Statistics for observations 
This table reports descriptive statistics on debt structure and firms’ characteristics of the sample firms. Column (1) reports the statistics of all observations. 
Column (2) is for firm-year without credit rating, where there are 724 firms and 5,397 observations. Column (3) is for firm-year with credit rating, where there 
are 141 firms and 1,192 observations. 
  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Full sample (6,589 observations) Without rating (5,397 observations) With rating  (1,192 observations) 
Mean S. D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max 
Dependent Variables                         
Bank Debt 0.31 0.246 0 0.974 0.291 0.248 0 0.974 0.386 0.210 0 0.889 
Non-bank Private Debt 0.671 0.256 0.026 1 0.696 0.258 0.026 1 0.569 0.212 0.109 1 
Public Debt 0.026 0.087 0 0.810 0.020 0.081 0 0.810 0.049 0.125 0 0.611 
Independent Variables                         
Total Assets 3.39E+09 6.26E+09 1.11E+08 1.46E+11 2.72E+09 4.41E+09 1.11E+08 1.37E+11 6.46E+09 1.08E+10 2.59E+08 1.46E+11 
Age 4.378 2.931 1 13 4.246 2.905 1 13 4.975 2.977 1 13 
Control Variables                         
Fixed Assets 0.222 0.137 0.0002 0.948 0.218 0.133 0.0002 0.948 0.239 0.154 0.0007 0.736 
Leverage 0.360 0.187 0.008 0.965 0.335 0.180 0.008 0.965 0.470 0.178 0.044 0.953 
ROA 0.054 0.070 -2.556 0.863 0.055 0.074 -2.555 0.863 0.045 0.047 -0.320 0.220 
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Table 2-5 Leverage regressions by debt type 
This table reports the regression results for each of the three debt types. The main independent 
variables are CreditD, which takes the value of 1 if the firm has credit rating, and 0 otherwise, 
Size, the natural logarithm of total assets, and Age, the number of years since the first listing at 
the stock market. Fixed assets ratio as a proxy for asset collateral value. Leverage measures 
firm’s risk. ROA reflects the firm’s profitability. 
 
Dependent Variables (All Observations) 
Independent Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
Bank Debt Non-bank Private Debt Public Debt 
CreditD 0.035*** -0.050*** 0.014*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) 
Size -0.039*** 0.022*** 0.016*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
Age 0.002 -0.0003 -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.0005) 
Fixed Assets 0.434*** -0.460*** 0.009 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.008) 
Leverage 0.597*** -0.620*** 0.025*** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.007) 
ROA -0.124** 0.116** 0.009 
 (0.039) (0.041) (0.016) 
Constant 0.810*** 0.531*** -0.316*** 
 (0.087) (0.094) (0.037) 
Adjusted R2 0.291 0.317 0.098 
    
Observations 5,799 5,309 5,379 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2-6 Leverage regressions by debt type 
This table reports the results for the firms’ characteristic and state ownership regression. The 
dependent variables are bank debt, non-bank private debt and public debt. The independent 
variables are the CreditD, firm size, age, fixed assets, leverage and ROA defined in Table 2-3. 
And the dummy variable OwnershipD, which takes the value of 1 if the firm is SOEs, and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Dependent Variables (All Observations) 
Independent Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
Bank Debt Non-bank Private Debt Public Debt 
CreditD 0.034*** -0.049*** 0.014*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) 
Size -0.039*** 0.023*** 0.016*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
Age 0.002 -0.001 -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.0005) 
Fixed Assets 0.432*** -0.458*** 0.009 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.008) 
Leverage 0.604*** -0.626*** 0.025*** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.007) 
ROA -0.124** 0.116** 0.009 
 (0.039) (0.041) (0.016) 
OwnershipD -0.077*** 0.074*** -0.002 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.005) 
Constant 0.815*** 0.524*** -0.316*** 
 (0.087) (0.094) (0.037) 
Adjusted R2 0.295 0.321 0.097 
    
Observations 5,799 5,309 5,379 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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3. Long-term stability of capital structure: Evidence from 
Chinese listed firms 
3.1. Introduction 
The recent empirical literature on capital structure has emphasized the long-term stability of 
cross-sectional leverage.7 Lemmon, Robert and Zender (2008)’s (hereafter LRZ (2008)) show 
that high (low) leveraged firms tend to remain as such for over twenty years and longer by using 
firm-year observations from 1965 to 2003 in the U.S.. Following LRZ (2008), Ito, Mikabe and 
Noma (2015) examines the stability of corporate leverage in Japan and shows that cross-
sectional leverage of Japanese firm generates surprisingly persistent and stationary during the 
period 1979-2013, which is consistent with the result in LRZ (2008). Although these studies 
expand researches on the long-term stability of cross-sectional leverage, there’s been some 
debates in the study on leverage evolution. DeAngelo and Roll (2015) provide counter-evidence 
that cross-sectional leverage changes frequently and dramatically from 1950 to 2008 for U.S. 
firms. Question on the long-term stability of cross-sectional leverage remains puzzled. 
Despite the empirical researches of long-term stability of cross-sectional leverage, there have 
been few theories in explaining the persistence in leverage ratios. Most previous theoretical 
models imply the same assumption: the capital structure is instable because the traditional 
determinants of capital structure are time-varying (such as firm size, profitability or market to 
book, etc.).8 LRZ (2008) analyze the effect of initial leverage on future leverage and illustrate 
the importance of firm fixed effects in the estimate regression analysis.9 Parsons and Titman 
(2008) comprehensive review the determinants of target leverage, cite LRZ (2008) for firm-
                                                             
7 Stability of cross-sectional leverage means that a firm’s current high or low leverage (relative to other firms) 
reliably predicts a comparable relative position in future cross-sections (DeAngelo and Roll (2015)). 
8 See Donaldson (1961), Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Haugen and Senbet (1978), Myer (1984), Myer and 
Majluf (1984), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Cadsby, Frank and Maksimovic (1990), Stulz (1990), Baker and 
Wurgler (2002), Graham (2003), Myer (2003), Morellec (2004), Welch (2004), Frank and Goyal (2008) for trade-
off, pecking order and market timing theories. 
9 The R2 of a typical cross-sectional book leverage regression without firm fixed effects is about 0.26, but when 
fixed effects are added it jumps to 0.66. 
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level stability evidence and suggest that previous studies fail to account for firm-specific, time-
invariant determinants of capital structure, such as managerial preferences, governance 
structure, corporate culture and so on. Frank and Goyal (2008) also point out that “a satisfactory 
theory must account for why firms keep leverage stationary”. 
The objective of this section is to add more evidence on the ongoing debate about the long-
term stability of leverage by using Chinese database. The sample contains the firms that listed 
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) during the period 1994-2016. Similar to the Japanese 
economy, the Chinese financial system is characterized by the bank-based, and firms establish 
long-term and relatively stable relation with commercial banks (Brandt and Li 2003). But unlike 
Japan and U.S., China is one of the emerging economies. The financial environment is more 
complicated than in developed countries. 
Besides the stability of leverage, there are two further analyses in this section. First, the 
stability of debt structure. Commercial bank loans and trade debt are the main components of 
Chinese debt structure.10 Financing from banks or commercial credit may contribute to the 
long-term stability of cross-sectional leverage. Therefore, my study divides debt into bank loans, 
trade debt, and replicates several analyses on them respectively. The result shows that both bank 
loans and trade debt drive the long-term stability of cross-sectional leverage for Chinese firms.  
Second, stability and state-ownership. In China, there are two critical financial reforms 
during 1994 to 2016, ownership of commercial bank is changed from “state-owned” (1994-
2003) to “state holding share equity owned” (2004 until now). The transformation of Chinese 
financial environment may affect the long-term stability of the capital structure. Brandt and Li 
(2003) report that state-owned commercial bank may prefer to lend to SOEs over non-SOEs by 
using Chinese survey data for the period between 1994 and 1997. However, there are no 
empirical analyses on the effect of state-ownership on stability after 2003. In the further 
research, I divide the firm’s ownership into SOEs and non-SOEs in China and examine the 
                                                             
10 The mean value of bank loans is 20%, which is the dominating component; trade debt, such as notes payable, 
accounts payable and advances from customers, is 16% of total assets; the mean value of the corporate bond is only 
around 1%. 
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future evolution of leverage.11 
There are five main analyses in this section. Analysis 1: Average stability. This section 
examines whether or not firms exhibit the long-term cross-sectional stability of leverage by 
following the empirical model constructed by LRZ (2008). In each calendar year, I sort firms 
into quartiles from their current leverage, holding the portfolio composition constant, compute 
the average leverage for each portfolio in the following 10 years. And draw figures to show the 
time-series pattern of leverage cross-sections. To control the effect of survivorship bias, I 
replicate these computations for a subsample of firms that surviving at least 10 years. 
Analysis 2: Unexpected stability. To control the time-varying effects from traditional 
determinants of capital structure, I modify the sorting procedure by estimating the regression 
of leverage on 1-year lagged determinants, and sort firms into four portfolios based on the 
residual from the regression. And draw the figure of average leverage of unexpected leverage 
portfolios in event time. Consistent with the prior literature (e.g., LRZ 2008, Ito, Mikabe and 
Noma 2015), the result finds that Chinese listed firms exhibit long-term stability of cross-
sectional leverage. 
Analysis 3: Leverage cross-section. I examine the extent of long-term cross-sectional 
stability of capital structure in the T years apart in time. By following DeAngelo and Roll (2015), 
in the first step, I compute the correlation coefficient between leverage in the two adjacent-year 
(for example 1994 and 1995, 1995 and 1996, etc.), and calculate the average squared cross-
sectional correlation coefficient over all pairs in the adjacent year. And then repeat the same 
process compute the correlation coefficient of the following pairs of several years (for example 
1994 and (1994+T), 1995 and (1995+T), etc.). Finally, I draw the figure of average squared 
cross-sectional correlation coefficient over all pairs of cross-sections that differ by T years. I 
find evidence that the extent of cross-sectional leverage stability for Chinese list firms is more 
stable than the U.S. firms. However, compared to Japanese counterparts, the stability of the 
cross-section is lower. 
                                                             
11 To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study on stability and state-ownership in China. Most of the 
existing literature analyze this question by using data before 2003. 
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Analysis 4: Regression analysis. To compare the impact of the firm’s initial leverage with 
traditional determinants of capital structure. I regress leverage on initial leverage ratio which 
reflects the time-invariant components and traditional determinants (e.g., firm size, market-to-
book profitability, tangibility and dividend payer etc.) which are varying over time and observes 
the effects of these determinants. The results indicate the coefficient of firms’ initial leverage is 
higher than traditional determinants of capital structure. And I further run the panel regression 
of leverage only on traditional determinant with and without firm fixed effects and compare the 
R2 under different condition. The results show that adjust R2 of regression with firm fixed effect 
bigger than without fixed effect. The finding on this issue suggest compared to traditional time-
varying determinants, some permanent time-invariant component like firms’ initial leverage is 
more important in explaining leverage stability. 
Analysis 5: Parameter sensitivities to model specifications. To solve the unobserved 
temporary variables, this section compares two specifications corresponding to a pooled OLS 
regression and a firm fixed effects regression. The finding reports the value of serial correlation 
coefficients is significantly large for all previously researches had analyzed, and consistent with 
Ito, Mikabe and Noma (2015). 
Table 3-1 summarizes the five main analyses in this section. It includes average stability, 
unexpected leverage, leverage cross-section, regression analysis and parameter sensitivities to 
model specifications.  
 
< Insert Table 3-1 here > 
 
There are three main results in this part. The first one is the cross-sectional leverage ratio 
shows remarkable convergence: differences of leverage ratio among these four portfolios are 
relatively large, and tend to become smaller 10 years later. Second, the results show that the 
average leverage ratio exhibits persistent long-term stability, firms with relatively high (low) 
leverage are still in their initial leverage portfolios. Cross-sectional leverage exhibits the similar 
convergence and stability when I do the same observation for firms that survivor 10 or more 
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than 10 years. Third, results from regression analysis find that the firm’s initial leverage has a 
stronger impact on future leverage than traditional time-varying determinants of capital 
structure, and the firm fixed effect is considered significant. These results are consistent with 
LRZ (2008) report for U.S. firms and also similar to Ito, Mikabe and Noma (2015)’s finding 
for Japanese firms. The primary results suggest that traditional time-varying determinants of 
capital structure could not explain firms’ convergence and long-term stability, the factors should 
contain some permanent, time-invariant components. 
Also, this section further analyzes two questions. First, the stability of debt structure. The 
results show that both bank loans and trade debt exhibit noticeable convergence and stability 
over the 10 years. The long-term stability of bank loans and trade debt may drive the long-term 
stability of total leverage for Chinese firms. Second, the further analysis focus on stability and 
state-ownership. The results find that for SOEs, the highest and high average leverage are 
persistent and stable over the subsequent 10 years. However, the low and lowest leverage 
changed frequently, especially in the last years. In another hand, non-SOEs show long-term 
stability and remarkable convergence among the four portfolio averages over time. The 
difference between the firm’s state-ownership partly depends on Chinese financial reform 
during this period. 
In short, the unique contribution of this section is that by focusing on Chinese listed firms, I 
add more new evidence on the long-term stability of leverage. To the best of my knowledge, 
this is the first empirical research on emerging financial market. This section also analyzes the 
stability of debt structure and the stability and state-ownership. The long-term persistence of 
total leverage drove by bank loans and trade debt. Especially, trade debt represents commercial 
credit in the funding resources. Firms built a relative close relation with their stakeholders, this 
kind of cooperation is relatively stable and persistent. The future evolution of leverage for SOEs 
appears to contradict the preconceptions that state-owned firms will use relative more leverage 
than private firms. Leverage of Non-SOEs exhibits long-term stability, but leverage of SOEs 
appears to show instable in the last years. Nevertheless, in the initial years, leverage of SOEs 
exhibits long-term stability. 
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The remainder of this section organized as follow. Section 3.2 summarizes previously 
theoretical researches, proposes hypotheses and reviews empirical analyses. Section 3.3 
introduces the data, defines the main variables and reports basic statistics. Section 3.4 and 3.5 
do the empirical analyses. This two parts find the evidence on the long-term stability of cross-
sectional leverage and run the regression analyses respectively. Section 3.6 is the further 
analyses in which I divide total leverage into bank loans and trade debt, leverage of SOEs and 
non-SOEs and replicate the same computations for a subsample of firms. Section 3.7 concludes 
the section. 
3.2. Previously Researches and Hypotheses 
This section briefly reviews the prominent theories of capital structure and empirical analyses 
on leverage.12 The theoretical models usually are summarized into the pecking-order theory, 
the trade-off theory and the market-timing theory. Based on these theories I propose the 
hypotheses of whether or not firms exhibit the long-term cross-sectional stability of leverage. 
And some existing empirical analyses find some pieces of evidence on how stable is the capital 
structure.  
3.2.1. Capital structure theories 
3.2.1.1. Existing theory (1) trade-off theory 
Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) propose a classical description of the trade-off theory that 
optimal leverage is the result of the trade-off between the tax benefits of debt and the 
deadweight costs of bankruptcy. Myers (1984) adds costs of financial distress, according to his 
analysis, when firms choose the capital structure, they will compare the benefit from tax shields 
against the cost of bankruptcy or financial trouble, and find an equilibrium between marginal 
                                                             
12 A more comprehensive review of the capital structure literature provided by Frank and Goyal (2008). 
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benefit and cost. Haugen and Senbet (1978) and Graham (2003) provide a comprehensive 
review and discussion of the literature on the tax effects and bankruptcy costs respectively.13 
Stulz (1990) provides a statement of the theory that agency cost is quite essential relative to 
taxes. Debt can mitigate conflicts between shareholders and managers. Morellec (2004) shows 
that “manager-shareholder conflicts can explain both the low debt levels observed in practice 
and the fact that high growth options firms tend to use less debt”. Frank and Goyal (2008) 
divided the trade-off theory into the static and dynamic trade-off theory according to whether 
or not the firm adjusted its target. The firm is followed by the static trade-off theory if its 
leverage only examined a single period, and the static firm had a target level of leverage and 
removed over time. Both of them investigate the optimal capital structure, and the latter looks 
more convenient to test because, in the real world, firms operate many periods. Dynamic trade-
off theory proposed that the optimal current capital structure choice of a firm depends on what 
expected on the future, transaction costs and taxes affect the firm’s financial choice in the 
different period.  
3.2.1.2. Existing theory (2) pecking-order theory 
Myer (1984) articulate Pecking-order theory clearly: “firms prefer internal to external fund 
(information asymmetries are assumed relevant only for outside investors). If external finance 
is required, firms will issue safety security, start with debt and only in extreme circumstances 
to equity for financing”.14 Adverse selection and agency cost considerations derive pecking-
                                                             
13 Haugen and Senbet (1978) argue that the bankruptcy costs should not play a significant role in the determinants 
of capital structure because the liquidation decision is independent of the event of bankruptcy. Graham (2003) 
reviews theoretical tax research and summaries of empirical evidence. The result generally supports the hypothesis 
that high tax rate firms pursue policies that provide tax benefits. 
14 There are many descriptive studies of pecking order theory, the root of it comes from the book by Donaldson 
(1961) who observes that “Management strongly favored internal generation as a source of new funds even to the 
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order theory.15 Cadsby, Frank and Maksimovic (1990) proposed pecking-order theory due to 
adverse selection, in which insider managers handled more and accurate information of the firm 
than the outsider investors, riskier firms tend to issue more overvalued equity, undervalued 
firms will not. Myers (2003) develops some version of agency costs explain pecking-order 
theory. Agency costs of equity could result in a financing hierarchy. 
3.2.1.3. Existing theory (3) market-timing theory 
The primary view is that firms tend to issue securities following current conditions of Stock 
Exchange. If the current stock price looks favorable, managers will issue equity even though 
the firm has no demand for funding. Alternatively, if the current stock price is unfavorable, the 
firm will defer issuances. Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Welch (2004) emphasize the 
importance of stock price of leverage and suggest that stock price fluctuates around its “true” 
values, the firm will issue shares when the firm’s market-to-book ratio is high. The affection of 
stock price can explain debt-equity ratios. This market timing hypothesis similar to the pecking 
order theory that market timing is the dominant determinant of the firm’s capital structure. 
3.2.2. Hypotheses 
3.2.2.1. Hypothesis 1: Long-term instability of the capital structure 
All existing traditional theories contain an implicit prediction that determinants of the firm’s 
capital structure will be changed over time. For example, the pecking-order theory argues that 
firms prefer internal finance over external funds, the more profitable firms will become less 
levered over time (Frank and Goyal (2009)). In the start-up stage of the firm, there are few 
                                                             
exclusion of external funds except for occasional unavoidable ‘bulges’ in need for funds.” 
15  Myers and Majluf (1984) build the adverse selection model by assuming firm’s managers have superior 
information, potential investors can only guess the firm’s assets and grow opportunities. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
propose that startups owned entirely by its managers, agency costs should be minimal. When firms issue “outside 
equity”, the agency costs increase.  
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profits. The firm should rely on external funds. The leverage will decrease as the firm developed. 
Kayhan and Titman (2007) also report that leverage and profitability are negatively related 
because firms passively accumulate profits. Firm size is another critical traditional determinant 
of capital structure when a small enterprise grows into a large firm, the firm’s capital structure 
would also be changed by the developing process and may vary in the future. 
Based on the view of time-varying determinants of capital structure, I can predict that the 
firm’s capital structure will fluctuate in the future. Hypothesis 1 is the long-term instability of 
the capital structure. 
3.2.2.2. Hypothesis 2: Long-term stability of the capital structure 
However, findings from U.S. and Japan challenge the traditional theories. The empirical 
results show that cross-sectional leverage exhibits remarkable stability over 20 years. There is 
no existing theory can explain the phenomenon entirely. The previous researches may miss 
some time-invariant factors (Ito, Mikabe and Noma 2015).  
In China, firms’ main financing sources are bank loans and commercial credit (such as trade 
debt). Firms establish long-term and close relation with commercial banks and their 
stakeholders. Based on the pieces of evidence from U.S. and Japan, I predict that the leverage 
of Chinese firms also exhibits long-term stability. Hypothesis 2 is the long-term stability of the 
capital structure. 
3.2.3. Empirical analysis of the capital structure 
3.2.3.1. Existing empirical analyses (1) traditional determinants of capital structure 
Many previous empirical studies highlight the successes of traditional theories of capital 
structure. Researches by Fama and French (2002), Frank and Goyal (2009) and comprehensive 
reviews by Graham and Leary (2011) examine the relative importance of many determinants 
of capital structure, such as firm size, age, tangible assets and market-to-book assets ratio etc. 
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The results find that these time-varying determinants of capital structure affect the level of 
leverage in the different direction. For example, small firms are significantly younger, have less 
tangible assets, higher market-to-book ratios, they likely face higher bankruptcy probabilities 
and thus have lower optimal leverage. And if firms grow larger and older, the optimal leverage 
will be increased. The future evolution of capital structure exhibits long-term instability.  
3.2.3.2. Existing empirical analyses (2) stability of the capital structure 
Recent empirical researches challenge the view of the instability of the capital structure. LRZ 
(2008) analyze cross-sectional leverage of nonfinancial firms in the Compustat database from 
1965 to 2003 in the U.S., they find that corporate capital structure is stable over long periods 
of time. Ito, Mikabe and Noma (2015) propose new evidence that cross-sectional leverage of 
Japanese firms exhibits long-term stability, firms with relatively high (or low) leverage continue 
to show relatively high (low) leverage for twenty years. However, by contrast, DeAngelo and 
Roll (2015) observe the instability of the leverage cross-section by analyzing industrial firms 
in the CRSP/Compustat file over 1950 to 2008 in the U.S., firms have high and low leverage at 
different times, but very few keep debt-to-assets ratios consistently above 0.5 for extended 
periods.  
3.2.3.3. Existing empirical analyses (3) analyses of capital structure in China 
There are several empirical types of researches on the capital structure of Chinese firms. Li, 
Yan and Gu (2014) analyze the determinants of capital structure in high-tech industries. Besides 
traditional factors like firm size, growth opportunity and ROA, they add the level of intellectual 
property protection to examine the effect on capital structure choice. The result shows that firms 
tend to choose equity financing if the level of intellectual property protection higher. Song, Wu 
and Ning (2014) test the policy impacts of capital structure using the dataset of Chinese listed 
firms during 2002 to 2012, they find that corporate capital structure adjustment has become 
faster during the period of loose monetary policy than the fixed period. There are few empirical 
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analyses on leverage stability in China. 
3.3. Data and basic statistics 
3.3.1. Database and data selection 
This part analyzes firms that listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) during the period 
1994 to 2016. I excluding firms operating from 1990 to 1993, because in the first three years, 
there are few firms listed on the board, and excluding firms operating in the financial sectors. 
SSE was established on November 26th, 1990 and opened on December 19th of the same year. 
It was supervised and managed by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). As a 
comprehensive, open and service-oriented exchange with a complete market structure, SSE 
provides products of stocks, bonds, funds and derivatives.16 At the end of 2016, the number of 
listed companies in the Shanghai Stock Market reached 1,182, the total market value of 28.5 
trillion Chinese Yuan. The number of investors in the Shanghai Stock Market has reached 224 
million 850 thousand households. 
All available financial information in this paper is from the China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research database (CSMAR or GTA database) which established in 2000, this 
database is the most extensive financial and economic information database in China that 
includes more than 60 types of database covering the Chinese financial markets, industrial 
research, and national and regional economic statistics. CSMAR database signed to CSRC in 
2003, from then it can be assembled the original data of firms’ balance sheet. The data is 
compensated for using, it can be accessed through CSMAR Solution (a web-based platform), 
and data can be retrieved.17 
                                                             
16 http://english.sse.com.cn 
17 http://en.gtafe.com 
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3.3.2. Definition of variables 
Table 2 documents the definition of leverage and other main variables. In the previous 
empirical analyses, several alternative definitions of leverage have been used, the views on 
which is a better measure of leverage are differ.18 In this section, I examine both book leverage 
and market leverage stability. Book leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to book value 
of assets. Total debt is the sum of short-term debt and long-term debt that includes bank loans, 
trade debt and corporate bonds. Market leverage is the ratio of total debt to market value of 
assets. The market value of assets is the sum of total debt plus market equity. I use the absolute 
value of book assets to measure firm size. In the following regression analysis, the firm size is 
measured by the logarithm values of book assets. The market-to-book ratio is the most 
commonly used proxy for growth opportunities, which defined as the sum of market equity plus 
total debt divided by book assets. ROA is the ration of operating income to book assets. 
Tangible assets, such as property, plant, and equipment, are easily measured for outside 
investors, which is the ratio of net PPE to book assets. In the further analysis, this paper divides 
book leverage into bank-loans-to-book-assets, trade-debt-to-book-assets and corporate-bonds-
to-book-assets, the detailed definitions of these variables are described in Table 3-2. 
 
< Insert Table 3-2 here > 
 
3.3.3. Basic statistics 
Table 3-3 reports descriptive statistics for all variables in this section. The full sample 
consists of 1,148 nonfinancial firms and 15,368 firm-year observations during the period 1994 
                                                             
18  In Myers (1977), managers prefer book leverage because financial markets fluctuate frequently, market 
leverage is not an accurate measurement. However, other researchers object that the book value of equity is measured 
what has taken place, it is assumed to be “backward looking”, the market value of equity is “forward-looking” 
(Welch 2004). 
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to 2016 (excluding data before 1994 because the firm-year observations are too few to analyze). 
The subsample consists of 783 listed firms and 14,178 firm-year observations survived 10 or 
more years as “Survivors”, the 10 years survived firms account for 68.2% of total firms.  
The mean value of book leverage for Chinese listed firms is 0.49, which is higher than 0.27 
for U.S. firms (LRZ 2008) and 0.26 for Japanese firms (Ito, Mikabe and Noma 2015). In 
contrast, the mean value of market leverage for Chinese listed firms is 0.25, lower than U.S. 
firms’ 0.28 and Japanese firms’ 0.33. Also, the value of market leverage is lower than those of 
book leverage, reflecting high average market-to-book (11.31 and 3.16) in the Chinese stock 
market. Bank loans and Trade debt account for 0.20 and 0.16 of total assets, which are 
dominated book leverage. Corporate bonds take quite a small portion, only accounting for 0.01.  
There are several differences between the full sample of all observations and subsample of 
10 years survivors. Survivors tend to have slightly higher book leverage (0.50), market leverage 
(0.25) and more profitable (2.81) in mean value, it has more growth opportunities (higher 
market-to-book valued 11.48), but smaller firm size (measured by book assets). It is consistent 
with the survey by Graham and Harvey (2001), growth firms are likely to be small. 
 
< Insert Table 3-3 here > 
 
3.4. Evidence on how stable the capital structure is 
3.4.1. Evidence 1: Average stability 
3.4.1.1. Methodology 
This section examines the evolution of the cross-sectional leverage of Chinese firms for 10 
years. The methodology is followed by the empirical research of LRZ (2008). First, in each 
calendar year, according to their current leverage ratio, I sort firms into quartiles (i.e., four 
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portfolios: highest, high, low and lowest). The portfolio formation year is denoted event year 0. 
Second, I calculate the average leverage for each portfolio in each of the subsequent 10 years, 
holding the portfolio composition constant (but for firms that exit the sample, through 
bankruptcy, acquisitions or buyouts). For example, in the year 1994 (event year 0), I sort firms 
into four portfolios according to the firms’ leverage ratios, and then computer these firms’ 
average book leverage in the same portfolios in the subsequent 10 years (from 1994 to 2004). 
Third, I repeat the same calculation for every year during the sample period. This process 
generates 23 sets of event-time averages, one for each calendar year in the sample (from 1994 
to 2016). It needs to mention that, from the year 2008, I can only compute the subsequent less 
than 10 years. Finally, after performing this sorting and averaging calculation, I calculate the 
average leverage of each portfolio across the 23 sets within each event year. The surrounding 
dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. I perform the similar calculation for both book 
leverage and market leverage in Panel A and B of Figure 3-1 respectively. 
 
< Insert Panel A of Figure 3-1 here > 
 
< Insert Panel B of Figure 3-1 here > 
 
One potential argument with interpreting Panel A of Figure 3-1 is the effect of survivorship 
bias. If the firm survives less than 10 years, its stability of leverage may come from the shorter 
duration in the sample. To address the bias, I repeat the same calculation only use the subsample 
of firms survive 10 or more than 10 years. Panel C of Figure 3-1 reports the subsample of book 
leverage portfolios which firms survive 10 or more than 10 years. 
 
< Insert Panel C of Figure 3-1 here > 
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3.4.1.2. Results 
Panel A of Figure 3-1 reports the evolution of book leverage. First, the average cross-
sectional leverage is distinctly persistent and stable over time. Firms with relatively high (low) 
leverage continue to exhibit relatively high (low) leverage for ten years. Second, there is a great 
deal of cross-sectional dispersion in the initial portfolio formation period. The initial book 
leverage from the highest to the lowest quartile portfolios is 71%, 54%, 41% and 24% 
respectively. An average difference is 16%. Third, the average cross-sectional leverage exhibits 
remarkable convergence among the four portfolios over time. The average book leverage 
rations from the highest to lowest quartile portfolios after 10 years are 60%, 56%, 51% and 46% 
respectively, an average difference from initial of 16% decreases to 5% after ten years. Panel B 
of Figure 1 shows that the market leverage portfolios also display a similar pattern: long-term 
stability and remarkable convergence among the four portfolio averages over time. 
In the later sections of this part, I focus on book leverage instead of market leverage in the 
following analysis, which is similar to Ito, Mikabe and Noma (2015), because some market-
related variables like market-to-book is varying fast with the fluctuation of financial market, 
these variables may cause spurious correlation with market leverage. By using book leverage, 
the “spurious correlation” problem can be overcome. 
To overcome “survivorship bias”, I observe the average book leverage portfolios of firms 
which survive 10 or more than 10 years as the subsample. The “survivorship bias” means the 
stability of leverage is because of the firm’s shorter duration. For example, during 1994 to 2016, 
there are several firms exit the market by bankruptcy, acquisitions, or buyouts, the life of these 
firms are less than 10 years. Also, for the firm which enter the market after 2008 I can only 
compute the subsequent less than 10 years, average cross-sectional leverage appears stable 
maybe due to their shorter life in the sample. The subsample of firm survive for at least 10 years 
contains 783 firms and 14,178 firm-year observations. The result for this subsample of firms is 
presented in Panel C of Figure 1, which is very similar to that of the full sample regarding 
leverage cross-section. Firms which survivor 10 years or longer also show stability and 
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remarkable convergence observably. 
In sum, the result of Figure 3-1 suggests that during a long-run period, average cross-
sectional leverage of Chinese listed firms exhibits persistent stability. Not only book but also 
market leverage tends to converge significantly over time, and after 10 years, the differences in 
leverages ratios always been reminded although becoming more and more few. In the 
subsample of firms which survive more than 10 years, the average cross-sectional leverage still 
exhibits long-term stability. 
3.4.2. Evidence 2: Unexpected stability 
3.4.2.1. Methodology 
There is another potential concern with explaining the cross-sectional stability, the sorting of 
listed firms by their average leverage. May only reflect the underlying determinants associated 
with cross-sectional variation in leverage. For example, previous researches find that, because 
of agency costs, expected future growth should be negatively related to leverage. Whatever, 
when I consider bankruptcy costs, leverage ratios may be positively associated with firm size, 
large firms should be more highly leveraged. And due to transaction costs, the past profitability 
of a firm also should be a critical determinant of its current capital structure. (e.g., Warner 1977, 
Titman and Wessels 1988, Rajan and Zingales 1995, Mackay and Phillips 2005, and others). 
To overcome this concern, I modify the sorting procedure. Each calendar year, first, I 
estimate a cross-sectional regression of leverage on 1-year lagged factors that have been 
discussed by the previously literature, in equation (1), these relevant determinants of the capital 
structure include firm size, profitability, market-to-book, tangibility and dividend payer. Second, 
I sort firms into four portfolios based on the residuals from the above regression, which I term 
“unexpected leverage,” and then calculate the average actual leverage of each portfolio over 
the subsequent 10 years. By estimating the regression from 1994 to 2016, I enable to control 
the marginal effect of traditional factors over time. 
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(3-1)           Leverageit = α + β﹒Xit-1 + εit 
 
Where i denotes listed firms; t denotes date; Xit-1 is a set of 1-year lagged explanatory 
determinants, these traditional factors include firm size, market to book, profitability, tangibility, 
and dividend payer, which as control variables; εit is a random error term. 
 
< Insert Figure 3-2 here > 
 
3.4.2.2. Results 
Figure 3-2 shows that by controlling time-varying effect, running the regression of leverage 
on traditional determinants of capital structure, the cross-sections of unexpected book leverage 
remain persistent and stable over ten years. The unexpected leverage portfolios differences still 
statistically and economically significant, tend to long-term stability. The range of highest 
average book leverage is 70% lowest average book leverage is 26%, at the beginning of event 
time, every unexpected book leverage portfolios exhibits remarkable dispersion. As time goes 
on, it became more and more convergence among the four portfolios. And all firms remain in 
the same portfolios, the highest and lowest unexpected book leverage is 61% and 46% 
respectively, high and low portfolios also between them. 
The overall results presented in Figure 1 and 2 for Chinese listed firms are very similar to 
those presented in LRZ (2008) for U.S. firms from 1965 to 2003 and Ito, Mikabe, and Noma 
(2015) for Japanese firms from 1979 to 2013. Average cross-sectional leverage of firm in these 
countries exhibits long-term converge and stability. These findings also similar to those 
presented in Acharya, John and Sundaram (2008) for U.K. unlisted firms for the period 1990 
to 2002, and these capital structure of private firms are also persistent and stable. One 
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explanation argues that the many similarities between the U.S. and U.K.’s economic and, in 
general, legal environments. However, many big differences between U.S., Japanese and 
Chinese environment. Although previously researchers try to explain this trend by using 
traditional determinants, it looks incomprehensive and can’t explain the stability of leverage 
perfectly. Besides time-varying determinants, the previous analysis may have missed some 
permanent, time-invariant components (Ito, Mikabe, and Noma 2015). 
3.4.3. Evidence 3-1: Leverage cross-section (correlation coefficient) 
3.4.3.1. Methodology 
To further analyze the long-term change of average leverage, I also examine how stable is 
the cross-sections of leverage by following DeAngelo and Roll (2015)’s conduction. Figure 3-
3 presents the average squared correlation coefficient versus the number of years between cross 
sections. The figure is constructed in the following manner. First, I calculate firms with 
correlation coefficient over all pairings of sample years. For example, in the first year 1994, I 
examine all firms with average book leverage. Holding these firm constant, and then calculate 
same firm’s average book leverage in the subsequent 10 years (from 1994 to 2004), and then 
treat 1994 and 1995 as a pair, compute the correlation between leverage in the two years, repeat 
this process in the following years (1994 and 1996…1994 and 2004). Second, I repeat the same 
calculation of the cross-sectional correlation coefficient which denotes ρ (t, T) between leverage 
in year t and t+T. This process generates 23 sets of event-time averages (from 1994 to 2016). It 
also needs to mention that, from the year 2008, I can only compute the subsequent less than 10 
years. Third, after obtaining the correlation coefficient across all pairings in all years, I compute 
the average squared correlation coefficient over all pairings of sample years following the 
equation (2) across the 23 sets within each event year. The number of correlations for a given 
T is N (T) = 59 – T. 
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In Figure 3-3, the horizontal axis denotes when I calculate the pairs of correlation coefficients, 
the number of years between cross sections. The vertical axis reports the adjusted average 
square correlation coefficient that differs by T years. Bootstrap procedure calculates confidence 
intervals (two standard error bands in dashes), resampling with replacement the individual 
squared correlations for each value of T, and using 1,000 sample replications. 
 
< Insert Figure 3-3 here > 
 
3.4.3.2. Results 
Figure 3-3 presents the extent of cross-sectional leverage stability in T years apart in time. 
The results show that the average R2 for adjacent-year leverage cross-sections is about 0.77, 
but declines to around 0.29 for cross-sections five years apart, and to about 0.08 for cross-
sections 10 years apart. These results are between DeAngelo and Roll (2015) reported for U.S. 
firms and Ito, Mikabe, and Noma (2015)’s finding for Japanese firms. Cross-sectional leverage 
of U.S. firms that differ by 20 years have an average R2 decline to about near-zero value and 
Ito, Mikabe, and Noma (2015) presents for Japanese firms’ cross-sectional leverage 20 years 
apart still have an average R2 of 0.31. The extent of cross-sectional leverage stability for 
Chinese list firms is between U.S. and Japanese firms. Although this indication of the stability 
of the cross-section is lower compared to the Japanese firm, it still reflects that cross-sectional 
leverage of Chinese firms is more stable than the U.S. counterparts. This opinion can be 
supported by the following analysis. 
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3.4.4. Evidence 3-2: Leverage cross-section (fraction of stability) 
3.4.4.1. Methodology 
In Table 3-4, I analyze the fraction of stability by using the subsample consisting of firms 
that survivor 10 or more than 10 years. First, I also sort firms into four portfolios based on 
average book leverage ratio in the initial event year 1994 (t=0). And record firms which still in 
the same portfolio in each of the subsequent 9 years (1995 to 2003, t=1 to 9). Second, I repeat 
the same recording for 1995 to 2007, treating each calendar year in turn as the initial event year 
(t=0) and then take notes on the fraction of firms always in the same leverage quartile in t=1, 
2, …, 9. Column (1) to (5) report the fraction of firms always in their initial quartile as of year 
t, there are 14 sets (from the year 1994 to 2007) of calculations of firms that have remained in 
the same portfolio from a given formation-year to the subsequent 9 years. The rows at the 
bottom show the fractions of firms with leverage in four, three or two different quartiles at 
different times over the 10 years. 
 
< Insert Table 3-4 here > 
 
3.4.4.2. Results 
The top of Table 3-4 presents the fraction of firms always in the initial (t=0) leverage quartile. 
Compared to the medium leverage fraction (low and high leverage), the two extreme quartiles 
lowest and highest leverage exhibit remarkable persistent, especially in lowest leverage, the 
fraction of firms is 19.0%, higher than what both DeAngelo (2015) report for U.S. firms 
(16.3%), and Ito, Mikabe, and Noma (2015) report for Japanese firms (16.8%). The fraction of 
Chinese firms remain in the highest quartile (29.1%) in between of U.S. and Japanese firms, it 
is a little bit smaller than Japanese firms (31.4%) but more than U.S. firms (11.7%).  
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The bottom of Table 3-4 shows the fraction of firms with leverage in different quartiles over 
the 10 years. From this line, I can compute the frequent firms move across-section leverage 
quartiles. For Chinese listed firms, only 18.6% of them remain in 4 different quartiles, 46.5% 
(1-53.5%) of these firms that remain in the initial leverage quartile or removed to only one 
different leverage quartile. The result consists of Ito, Mikabe, and Noma (2015) reported for 
Japanese firms. The corresponding value is 43.6%. From column (2) to (5) of the bottom of 
Table 3-4, I do the same calculation. The result is also similar to Japanese firms. The fraction 
of firms that move away to at most one different leverage quartile over the 10 years in two 
medium quartiles (low leverage quartile and high leverage quartile) is relatively smaller. The 
corresponding values are 36.5% and 43.9%, respectively (for Japanese firms, 28.8% and 40.5%, 
respectively according to Ito, Mikabe, and Noma (2015), for U.S. firms, the corresponding 
value are 25.9% and 23.6% respectively reported by DeAngelo and Roll (2015)). For the lowest 
quartile and highest quartile, the corresponding values are 54.8% and 55.1%. The results reflect 
that compare to medium quartile, the extreme quartiles exhibit more persistence in leverage, 
this trend is similar to Japanese firms, higher than U.S. firms (for Japanese firms, 46% and 
64.4%, respectively according to Ito, Mikabe, and Noma (2015), for U.S. firms, the 
corresponding value are 36.8% and 35.4% respectively reported by DeAngelo and Roll (2015)). 
In sum, this section adds some new pieces of evidence that for Chinese listed firms, the cross-
section of leverage ratios exhibits persistent stability in the 10-year period, not only book 
leverage but also market leverage, firms which survivor 10 or more than 10 years also show the 
same trend. Figure 3-1 and 3-2 shows that firms’ average leverage ratios appear long-term 
stability and more convergence over time. The finding consists of U.S. and Japanese firms 
which reported by LRZ (2008) and Ito, Mikabe, and Noma (2015). This section also examines 
the fractions of firms that remain in or move out to one particular quartile. Figure 3-3 and Table 
3-4 show that the fraction of firms that remain in the two extreme leverage quartiles, the lowest 
and highest quartiles are relatively higher, and both of them exhibit long-term persistent stability. 
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3.5. Analysis of the stable of the capital structure 
3.5.1. Analysis 1: Regression analysis 
The previously researches examine the traditional determinants of capital structure, like firm 
size, profitability, market-to-book or tangible, and do quite a lot of empirical test. But most of 
them are only focus on time-varying variables. They may be miss some important factors of 
capital structure that contain a permanent, time-invariant component (Ito, Mikabe, and Noma 
2015). In this section, I try to run the cross-sectional regression of the average leverage ratio on 
traditional factors and firm’s initial leverage and further run the regression on firm fixed effect 
instead of initial leverage.  
3.5.1.1. Methodology 
The above stability analyses of capital structure show that firms’ leverage ratios in the first 
event time are highly related to their future leverage, for example, results of Figure 3-3 and 
Table 3-4 show that firms with high (or low) leverage in a given cross-section tend to have high 
(or low) leverage in the cross-section T years apart in time. The analysis denotes firms’ leverage 
in the first year when they enter the sample as initial leverage. The methodology in this section 
followed Ito, Mikabe, and Noma (2015) to estimate the regression as equation (3) shows. 
 
(3-3)           Leverageit = α + β﹒Xit-1 + γ﹒Leverageio + νt + εit 
   
Where i denotes listed firms; t indicates date; Xit-1 is a set of 1-year lagged explanatory 
determinants, these traditional determinants include firm size, market-to-book ratio, ROA, 
tangibility and dividend payer, which as control variables; Leverageio denotes firm i’s initial 
leverage; υ is a year fixed effect; ε is a random error term. 
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< Insert Table 3-5 here > 
 
3.5.1.2. Results 
The results were reported in Table 3-5, by estimating panel OLS regressions of book leverage 
on 1-year lagged time-varying factors and firms’ initial leverage, I can observe the impact of 
initial leverage on future leverage. Column (a) of Table 3-5 only run the regression on initial 
leverage. The coefficient is 0.53, it shows that this time-invariant factor has the significantly 
positive correlation with book leverage, reflect that firms’ future leverage is highly related to 
their initial leverage. In column (b) and (c) I add some time-varying factors like firm size, 
market-to-book ratio etc., although coefficient of initial leverage decrease to 0.44 and 0.43, it 
remains high and significant, and is far above other traditional determinants of capital structure. 
The adjusted R2 changes almost nothing is 0.23, 0.22 and 0.23 respectively. The results of Table 
3-5 present that comparing traditional determinants, the estimated coefficient of initial leverage 
is beyond all time-varying factors, and firm’s time-invariant factor (initial leverage) has a 
stronger impact on future leverage. 
In Table 3-6 I run the regression on firm fixed effect instead of initial leverage. Column (a) 
reports that if the model only contains firm fixed effect, the adjusted R2 is 0.51. Column (b) 
replaces firm fixed effect with year fixed effect, the adjusted R2 decreases sharply to 0.05. 
Column (c) reports if the model contains both firm fixed effect and year fixed effect, the 
adjusted R2 increases to 0.58. If this model adds several traditional determinants what I have 
analyzed in Table 3-5, I can compare column (d), (e), (f) and (g), the influence of firm fixed 
effect is significant and noticeable, the adjusted R2 is jumping up from around 0.10 to 0.62. By 
comparing two teams (team 1 includes column (a), (c), (e) and (g) which run the regression on 
firm fixed effect, team 2 includes column (b), (d) and (f) which run the regression without firm 
fixed effect). The finding shows that firm fixed effect is considered significant. 
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< Insert Table 3-6 here > 
 
In sum, the results reported in Table 3-5 and Table 3-6 present that, compared to traditional 
time-varying determinants, some permanent time-invariant component like firms’ initial 
leverage or firm fixed effect are more important. The result indicates firms’ initial leverage or 
fixed effect can partly explain why cross-section leverage of Chinese listed firm exhibits long-
term stability. The findings consist of the results which report by Ito, Mikabe, and Noma (2015) 
for Japanese firms. 
3.5.2. Analysis 2: Parameter sensitivities to model specifications 
3.5.2.1. Methodology 
To solve these problems which argued by Greene (2012), that in the analysis of cross-section 
leverage stability, there are some unobserved temporary variables, if these temporary factors 
were neglected in capital structure regression, and it will lead to inefficient parameter estimates 
and adverse effect on the statistical deduction. 
Table 3-7 compares the coefficient estimates for two specifications corresponding to a pooled 
OLS regression and a firm fixed effects regression. The firm fixed effect estimation estimates. 
 
(3-4)           Leverageit = α + β﹒Xit-1 + ηi + νt + υit   υit = ρ﹒υit-1 + εit 
 
This function is followed Ito, Mikabe, and Noma (2015) reported where ηi is a firm fixed 
effect; Xit-1 indicates a set of 1-year lagged control variables, νt is year fixed effect; uit is a fixed 
variable; εit is a random error term; ρ is serial correlate errors. 
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< Insert Table 3-7 here > 
 
3.5.2.2. Results 
Table 3-7 reports the value of serial correlation coefficients AR(1) is 0.63, it is significantly 
large for all previously researches had analyzed, and consistent with Ito, Mikabe, and Noma 
(2015) report 0.79 for Japanese firms. 
In this part of regression analyses on capital structure, I add the evidence that both initial 
leverage and firm fixed effect impact on firms’ future leverage, these time-invariant 
components partly explain the long-term stability of the cross-section leverage. 
3.6. Further analyses 
3.6.1. Stability of debt structure: bank loans and trade debt 
3.6.1.1. Motivation and methodology 
Since the reform and opening, then the Chinese government had taken efforts to construct 
the socialistic market economy. Although listed firms can raise funds by issuing shares to the 
public, in their debt choice, bank loans are the most critical channel for financing. Table 3 shows 
that the mean value of bank loans is 20% which is the dominating component. Firms construct 
the very close relationship with the commercial bank, like Japan (Aoki, Patrick and Sheard 
1995). Also, the results of Table 3-3 find that the other kind of financing resources is from trade 
debt (the mean value is 16%, which is slightly smaller than bank loans), contains notes payable, 
accounts payable and advances from customers that based on commercial credit. The merest 
small component of funding sources among Chinese listed firms is the corporate bond, is only 
around 1%. Financing from banks or commercial lending may be related to the long-term 
stability of cross-sectional leverage. In this section, I further analyze the evolution of bank loans 
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and trade debt. 
In this section, I separate book leverage into the above two main components: bank loans to 
total assets and trade debt to total assets, and analyze the evolution of them separately by using 
the same methods. I examine the stability of bank loans and trade debt following the previous 
methodology used in Figure 3-1. 
3.6.1.2. Results 
Panel A and B of Figure 3-4 report the results of the long-term trend of the change in bank 
loans and trade debt. Similar to total book leverage portfolios that present in Figure 3-1. First, 
in the initial portfolio formation period, the cross-sectional dispersion is significantly 
remarkable. The highest average book leverage based on bank loans and trade debt is 38.9% 
and 29.7% respectively, and lowest bank loans (trade debt) leverage is 3.0% (3.1%). Second, 
both bank loans and trade debt are exhibit remarkable convergence among the four portfolios 
over time. After 10 years, the highest bank loans leverage decline to 23.7% and lowest bank 
loans leverage to increase to 15.6%. Trade debt leverage also displays a similar pattern. It 
indicates that firms financed from banks and commercial credit are both contribute to total book 
leverage convergence and persistence. Third, bank loans and trade debt average leverage are 
also stability over the 10 years. In the four leverage portfolios, firms with relatively high (low) 
loan (trade debt) ratio also remain in the same interval. I didn’t examine the corporate bond 
leverage changing, because, in the Chinese bond market, there is few firms issue bonds or bond 
component is very slim. I ignore the analysis of corporate bond in the following section. 
 
< Insert Figure 3-4 here > 
 
In Figure 3-5, I estimate a cross-sectional regression of loan ratio and trade debt on 1-year 
lagged determinants such as firm size, ROA, market-to-book ratio, tangibility, and dividend 
payer, respectively. The results show that not only the loan ratio but also trade debt unexpected 
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book leverage which based on the residuals from this regression also exhibit long-term stability. 
It is similar to Figure 3-2, by controlling time-varying factors of capital structure many 
previously research tested, firms with high or low bank loans (trade debt) remain in their initial 
leverage portfolios. 
 
< Insert Figure 3-5 here > 
 
In sum, Figure 3-4 and 3-5 present firms’ bank loans and trade debt exhibit long-term cross-
sectional persistent, I can observe that these two main components of leverage contribute to 
total leverage stability for Chinese listed firms. On the following analysis, I test whether or not 
firms’ future leverage affected by their initial leverage. 
In Table 3-8, I run the regression of leverage on initial bank loans or initial trade debt 
compared to other traditional determinants. Column (a) of Table 3-8 presents initial loan ratio 
is significantly positively related to cross-sectional leverage, the value of the coefficient is 0.48 
by controlling year fixed effect. In column (b) and (c), if I add time-varying factors, I can 
observe the value of initial loan ratio efficient decreased (0.42, 0.41 respectively), but still much 
higher than other determinants of capital structure. Compared to initial loan ratio, in column 
(d), (e) and (f), initial trade debt is a little bit lower but much higher than other time-varying 
determinants. The results of Table 3-8 indicate that bank loans are the most important factor to 
explain the long-run stability of firms’ leverage, but it is not a sing determinant. Trade debt that 
represents commercial credit also influences the persistent of future leverage. 
< Insert Table 3-8 here > 
 
Similar to Figure 3-3, I use the same methodology to analyze the value of correlation 
coefficients for adjacent-year leverage cross-sectional bank loans and trade debt. The results 
present that the average R2 for the first adjacent-year loans leverage is 0.71, declines to 0.23 for 
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cross-section five years apart, and to around 0.05 for cross-sections 10 years apart. The average 
R2 for the first adjacent-year trade debt leverage is 0.73, declines to 0.34 for cross-section five 
years apart, and to around 0.17 for cross-sections 10 years apart. It indicates that both bank 
loans and trade debt exhibit the similar persistent to the total leverage. 
 
< Insert Figure 3-6 here > 
 
Totally, in this part, I investigate the cross-section of bank loans and trade debt for 10 years. 
Both of them exhibit long-term stability which is very similar to what present in total leverage. 
The finding suggests that, for Chinese listed firms, the long-term persistence of total leverage 
may drove by bank loans and trade debt. This finding is also consistent with Ito, Mikabe, and 
Noma (2015)’s report for Japanese firms. 
3.6.2. Stability and state-ownership: capital structure of SOEs and non-SOEs 
3.6.2.1. Motivation and Methodology 
In the above analysis, the results show that bank loans contribute to the long-term stability 
of leverage considerably. Historically, the financial system of China is state-owned bank-
centered. From the 1970s to the 1990s, Chinese commercial banks support state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) through “policy lending”. At the end of 2003, the reformation of the Chinese 
financial system entered “State Holding Share Equity Commercial Bank Period”. This part tries 
to show cross-sectional leverage evolution of SOEs and Non-SOEs and examines what factors 
affect the future development of average leverage of these subsample firms. 
Methodologies used in this part are the same with previous analyses in section 4 and section 
5. Table 3-9 reports descriptive statistics for all variables based on state-ownership. The SOEs 
sample in this paper consists of 993 firm-year observations during the period 1994 to 2016 on 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The Non-SOEs sample consists of 14,379 firm-year 
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observations. The median value of book leverage for SOEs is 0.48, equal to Non-SOEs; the 
median value of market leverage for SOEs is 0.15, higher than for Non-SOEs’ 0.10. Similar to 
full samples, both Bank loans and Trade debt account for 0.16 and 0.14 (0.19 and 0.12) of total 
assets and dominate book leverage for SOEs (Non-SOEs). The basic statistics show that SOEs 
are bigger and more profitable than Non-SOEs. 
 
< Insert Table 3-9 here > 
 
3.6.2.2. Results 
Panel A of Figure 3-7 reports that the book leverage portfolios for SOEs exhibit a great deal 
of cross-sectional dispersion in the initial portfolio formation period. The range of highest 
average leverage is 68%, the lowest average leverage is 21%. As time goes by, the average 
leverage ratio exhibits remarkable convergence among the four portfolios. After 10 years, the 
average book leverage of the highest quartile portfolio has declined to 55%, whereas that of the 
lowest quartile portfolio has increased from 49%, and it becomes a low quartile portfolio. The 
initial low quartile portfolio decreases into the lowest quartile portfolio account for 41%. The 
results show that the average leverage in highest and high portfolio are persistent and stable 
over the subsequent 10 years, it suggests that these firms borrowing from commercial banks 
and trade debt are stable. However, the low and lowest leverage changed sharply especially in 
the last 3 years, one possible explanation is that the reform of Chinese financial system affects 
the leverage stability of SOEs, these firms especially poor repayment abilities of enterprises 
fluctuated greatly. 
Panel B of Figure 3-7 reports that cross-sectional leverage of Non-SOEs also exhibits long-
term stability, firms with relatively high (low) leverage continue to exhibit relatively high (low) 
leverage for ten years. The results of Figure 3-7 consist with the finding in full sample, in the 
following study, I will examine the importance of initial leverage and firm’s fixed effect by 
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using regression analysis. 
 
< Insert Panel A of Figure 3-7 here > 
 
< Insert Panel B of Figure 3-7 here > 
 
Table 3-10 reports the results of panel OLS regressions of book leverage on 1-year lagged 
time-varying factors and firms’ initial leverage based on state-ownership, I can observe the 
impact of initial leverage on future leverage for SOEs and Non-SOEs in column (a) and (d), 
and both of them show that initial leverage has significant positive correlation with book 
leverage. In column (b), (c) and (e), (f), I add some time-varying factors like firm size, market-
to-book ratio etc., although coefficient of initial leverage decrease, it remains high and 
significant, and is far above other traditional determinants of capital structure. The adjusted R2 
changes almost nothing. The results of Table 10 present that comparing traditional determinants, 
the estimated coefficient of initial leverage is beyond all time-varying factors, and firm’s time-
invariant factor (initial leverage) has a stronger impact on future leverage. 
 
< Insert Table 3-10 here > 
 
Table 3-11 run the regression on firm fixed effect instead of initial leverage. Column (a) and 
(h) report that if the model only contains firm fixed effect, the adjusted R2 is 0.55 and 0.52 
respectively based on state-ownership. Column (b) and (i) replace firm fixed effect with year 
fixed effect, the adjusted R2 decreases sharply to 0.03 and 0.05 respectively. Column (c) and (j) 
report if the model contains both firm fixed effect and year fixed effect, the adjusted R2 
increases to 0.60 and 0.58 respectively. If this model adds several traditional determinants that 
have analyzed in Table 3-4, I can compare column (d), (e), (f), (g) and (k), (l), (m), (n), the 
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influence of firm fixed effect is significant and noticeable, the adjusted R2 jump up from around 
0.1 to 0.65. The finding shows that firm fixed effect is considered necessary. 
 
< Insert Table 3-11 here > 
 
3.7. Conclusions 
This section adds new evidence that the cross-sectional leverage for Chinese listed firms 
exhibits long-term persistence stability during 1994 to 2016. The result consists of LRZ (2008) 
report for U.S. firms and Ito, Mikabe, and Noma (2015) finds for Japanese firms: for a long 
time, the average cross-sectional leverage shows a significant convergence and remarkable 
stability, firms with high (or low) leverage in the initial year tend to remain the same high (or 
low) leverage in the future.  
The result presents some new finding of the long-term stability of leverage for Chinese firms, 
to the best of my knowledge, this is the first empirical research on Chinese financial market 
and the first time that add trade debt which represents commercial credit in the model. The 
further analysis shows that both bank loans and trade debt exhibit remarkable stability and 
persistent. Firms built a relatively close relationship with their stakeholders, this kind of 
cooperation is relatively stable and persistent. The finding suggests that for Chinese listed firms, 
both bank loans and trade debt drive long-term stability of cross-sectional leverage. This section 
analyzes the future evolution of leverage for SOEs and non-SOEs, both of them exhibit long-
time stability, but this trend is more apparent for non-SOEs, it suggests that private firms are 
less affected by Chinese financial reform. In the future research, I will deeply analyze by adding 
more observations and methodology to examine more permanent, time-invariant determinants 
of capital structure.  
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Table 3-1 Main Analyses 
This table summarizes the five main analyses in section 3. It includes average stability, unexpected leverage, leverage cross-section, regression analysis 
and parameter sensitivities to model specifications. The results report that Chinese listed firms exhibit long-term stability of cross-sectional leverage, 
and the former research on capital structure should account for time-invariant determinants. 
Main Analyses Methodology Results 
Analysis 1: 
Average stability 
Sort firms into quartiles from their current leverage (or residual from regression on 
time-varying determinants of capital structure), holding the portfolio composition 
constant, compute the average leverage for each portfolio in the following 10 
years. 
The result reports that Chinese listed firms exhibit long-
term stability of cross-sectional leverage. 
Analysis 2:  
Unexpected stability 
Each calendar year, first, I estimate a cross-sectional regression of leverage on 1-
year lagged factors. Second, I sort firms into four portfolios based on the residuals 
from the above regression, which I term “unexpected leverage,” and finally, 
calculate the average actual leverage of each portfolio over the subsequent 10 
years. 
The result shows the extent of cross-sectional leverage 
stability for Chinese list firms. 
Analysis 3:  
Leverage cross-section 
Compute the correlation coefficient between leverage in the two adjacent-year, 
and calculate the average squared cross-sectional correlation coefficient over all 
pairs in the adjacent year. And then repeat the same process compute the 
correlation coefficient of the following pairs of several years.  
I find evidence that the extent of cross-sectional leverage 
stability for Chinese list firms is more stable than the U.S. 
firms. However, compared to Japanese counterparts, the 
stability of the cross-section is lower. 
Analysis 4:  
Regression analysis 
Regress leverage on initial leverage ratio which reflect the time-invariant 
components and traditional determinants (e.g., firm size, market-to-book 
profitability, tangibility and dividend payer etc.) which are varying over time. 
The results indicate coefficient of firms’ initial leverage is 
higher than traditional determinants of capital structure. 
Analysis 5:  
Parameter sensitivities 
to model specifications 
Compare two specifications corresponding to a pooled OLS regression and a firm 
fixed effects regression. 
The finding reports the value of serial correlation 
coefficients is significantly large for all previously 
researches had analyzed. 
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Table 3-2 Definitions of Variables 
This table defines the main variables used in this section. The main dependent variable is the 
book leverage which defined as the ratio of total book debt to total book assets (Debt / TA). 
Market leverage is the ratio of total book debt to the sum of book debt plus the market value of 
common stock. The explanatory variables include firm size, market-to-book ratio, ROA, and 
tangibility. In the further analysis, I divides the book leverage into bank-loans-to-book-assets, 
trade-debt-to-book-assets, and corporate-bonds-to-book-assets. 
Variable Definition 
Total book debt Short-term debt + long-term debt 
Where total debt is divided into bank loans, trade debt and corporate bonds. 
Book leverage Total book debt / total book assets 
Market equity Stock price * shares outstanding 
Market leverage Total book debt / (total book debt + market equity) 
Firm size Total book assets 
Market-to-book ratio (Market equity + total debt) / book assets 
ROA Net income / book assets 
Tangibility Net PPE / book assets 
Bank loans Short-term bank loans + long-term bank loans 
Book leverage 
 (Bank loans) 
Bank loans / book assets 
 
Trade debt Notes payable + accounts payable + advances from customers 
Book leverage  
(Trade debt) 
Trade debt / book assets 
 
Corporate Bonds Short term corporate bonds + long term corporate bonds 
Book leverage  
(Corporate Bonds) 
Corporate bonds / book assets 
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Table 3-3 Basic Statistics 
Table 3-3 reports descriptive statistics for all variables in this paper. The full sample in this section consists of all nonfinancial 1,148 list firms and 
15,368 firm-year observations during the period 1994 to 2016 in Shanghai Stock Exchange. This section also focuses on the subsample of 783 listed 
firms and 14,178 firm-year observations survived 10 or more years as “Survivors”, the 10 years survived firms account for 68.2% of total firms. 
 
All Observations  10 Year Survivors 
Variable Mean Median SD Mean Median SD 
Book leverage 0.49 0.49 0.20 0.50 0.50 0.19 
Market leverage 0.25 0.14 0.26 0.25 0.15 0.26 
Book leverage 
(Bank Loans) 
0.20 0.19 0.15 0.21 0.20 0.15 
Book leverage  
(Trade Debt) 
0.16 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.12 
Book leverage  
(Corporate Bonds) 
0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.03 
Firm size  
(Book Assets) 
1.31E+10 2.28E+09 7.44E+10 1.21E+10 2.16E+09 7.27E+10 
Market-to-book ratio 11.31 3.16 28.69 11.48 3.19 29.49 
ROA 2.74 0.95 11.12 2.81 1.02 11.12 
Tangibility 0.27 0.24 0.19 0.28 0.24 0.19 
Dividend payer 0.33 0.24 0.64 0.30 0.21 0.63 
Obs. 15368 14178 
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Table 3-4 Fraction of Firms Always in Their Initial Leverage Quartile 
Table 3-4 analyzes the fraction of stability by using the subsample consisting of firms that 
survivor 10 or more than 10 years. First, I also sort firms in to four portfolios based on average 
book leverage ratio in initial event year 1994 (t=0). And record firms which still in the same 
portfolio in each of the subsequent 9 years (1995 to 2003, t=1 to 9). Second, I repeat the same 
recording for 1995 to 2007, treating each calendar year in turn as the initial event year (t=0) 
and then take notes on the fraction of firms always in the same leverage quartile in t=1, 2, …, 
9. Column (1) to (5) report the fraction of firms always in their initial quartile as of year t, there 
are 14 sets (from year 1994 to 2007) of calculations of firms that have still remain in the same 
portfolio from a given formation-year to the subsequent 9 years. The rows at the bottom show 
the fractions of firms with leverage in four, three or two different quartiles at different times 
over the 10 years. 
 Fraction of firms always in initial (t=0) leverage quartile: 
Full 
sample 
Lowest 
leverage 
Low 
leverage 
High 
leverage 
Highest 
leverage 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
12.1% 19.0% 4.0% 2.8% 29.1% 
 
Fraction of firms with leverage in four, three or two different quartiles in different years: 
4 quartiles 18.6% 27.6% 12.6% 14.1% 23.4% 
at least 3 53.5% 45.2% 63.5% 56.1% 44.9% 
at least 2 50.8% 41.9% 50.2% 61.9% 46.5% 
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Table 3-5 Impact of Initial Leverage on Future Leverage 
Table 3-5 reports the results of panel OLS regressions of book leverage on traditional 
determinants of capital structure and firm’s initial leverage.  
Leverageit = α + β﹒Xit-1 + γ﹒Leverageio + νt + εit 
Where i denotes listed firms; t denotes date; Xit-1 is a set of 1-year lagged explanatory 
determinations, these traditional determinants include firm size, market-to-book ratio, ROA, 
tangibility and dividend payer, which as control variables; Leverageio denotes firm i’s initial 
leverage; υ is a year fixed effect; ε is a random error term.  
Variable (a) (b) (c) 
Initial leverage         0.53*** 0.44*** 0.43*** 
 (59.89) (46.42) (45.72) 
Firm size   0.02*** 0.03*** 
  (19.12) (20.99) 
Market-to-book ratio  -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
  (-5.65) (-5.45) 
ROA  0.0007*** 0.0008*** 
  (4.98) (6.01) 
Tangibility  -0.04*** -0.04*** 
  (-4.53) (-5.56) 
Dividend payer   -0.03*** 
   (-13.97) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Adj.R2 0.23 0.22 0.23 
    
Obs. 15,368 14,293 14,293 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3-6 Panel Regression with Firm Fixed Effects 
Table 3-6 reports the results of panel OLS regressions of book leverage. Column (a) reports the result of that if the model only contains firm fixed 
effect. Column (b) replaces firm fixed effect with year fixed effect. Column (c) reports the results of that if the model contains both firm fixed effect 
and year fixed effect. Column (d), (e), (f) and (g) add several traditional determinants what I have analyzed in Table 3-5. 
Variable (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
Firm fixed effect Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
        
Year fixed effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Firm size - - - 0.04
*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.06*** 
    (28.54) (30.64) (30.56) (30.68) 
Market-to-book ratio - - - -0.0004
*** -0.00001*** -0.0003*** -0.00001*** 
    (-6.63) (-0.41) (-6.38) (-0.43) 
ROA - - - 0.001
*** 0.0004*** 0.001*** 0.0004*** 
    (6.75) (3.74) (7.89) (3.74) 
Tangibility - - - -0.07*** -0.009*** -0.08*** -0.009*** 
    (-8.42) (-0.93) (-9.54) (-0.90) 
Dividend payer 
- - - - - -0.04*** -0.005*** 
 
   - - (-15.87) (-1.59) 
Adj.R2 0.51 0.05 0.58 0.10 0.62 0.12 0.62 
        
Obs. 15,368 15,368 15,368 14,293 14,293 14,293 14,293 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3-7 Parameter Sensitivities to Model Specification 
Table 3-7 reports coefficient estimates for two specifications corresponding to a pooled OLS and a firm fixed effects regression. The table also reports 
the percent change in the magnitude of the coefficient when changing the model specification from Pooled OLS to Firm FE. AR (1) is the estimated 
first-order serial correlation coefficient. 
Variable Pooled OLS Firm FE %Change Pooled OLS Firm FE %Change 
Firm size  0.04*** 0.06*** 74% 0.04*** 0.06*** 63% 
 (27.19) (30.87)  (29.19) (30.99)  
Market-to- book ratio -0.0003*** 0.00003 -110% -0.0003*** 0.00003 -111% 
 (-6.08) (0.89)  (-5.84) (0.90)  
ROA 0.0009*** 0.0004*** -56% 0.001*** 0.0004*** -62% 
 (6.55) (3.75)  (7.66) (3.73)  
Tangibility -0.07*** 0.02* -127% -0.08*** 0.02* -124% 
 (-8.69) (2.07)  (-9.73) (2.02)  
Dividend payer    -0.04*** 0.008* -120% 
    (-15.25) (2.57)  
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
       
Adj.R2 0.09   0.11   
AR(1)  0.63   0.63  
Obs. 14,293 14,293  14,293 14,293  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3-8 Effect of Initial Bank Loans and Initial Trade Debt on Future Leverage 
Table 3-8 reports the results of panel OLS regressions of book leverage on traditional 
determinants of capital structure and firm’s initial bank loans or initial trade debt.  
Leverageit = α + β﹒Xit-1 + γ﹒Leverageio + νt + εit 
Where i denotes listed firms; t denotes date; Xit-1 is a set of 1-year lagged explanatory 
determinations, these traditional determinants include firm size, market-to-book ratio, ROA, 
tangibility and dividend payer, which as control variables; Leverageio denotes firm i’s initial 
bank loans or initial trade debt; υ is a year fixed effect; ε is a random error term. 
Variable (a) (b) (c) (d) （e） (f)  
Initial bank loans 0.48*** 0.42*** 0.41***     
 (40.89) (35.52) (34.53)     
Initial trade debt    0.38*** 0.29*** 0.29***  
    (24.46) (17.24) (17.67)  
Firm size  0.04*** 0.04***  0.04*** 0.04***  
  (28.61) (31.88)  (28.26) (30.35)  
Market-to-book ratio  -0.0002*** -0.0002***  -0.0002*** -0.0002***  
  (-4.42) (-3.96)  (-5.43) (-4.84)  
ROA  0.0008*** 0.0009***  0.001*** 0.001***  
  (6.39) (7.34)  (8.10) (9.20)  
Tangibility  -0.09*** -0.10***  -0.03*** -0.04***  
  (-11.62) (-12.51)  (-3.90) (-4.91)  
Dividend payer   -0.03***   -0.04***  
   (-13.05)   (-15.71)  
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Adj.R2 0.14 0.19 0.20 0.08 0.13 0.15  
Obs. 15,368 14,293 14,293 15,368 14,293 14,293  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3-9 Basic Statistics Based on State-ownership 
Table 3-9 reports descriptive statistics for all variables based on state-ownership. The state-owner enterprises sample in this paper consists 993 firm-
year observations during the period 1994 to 2016 in Shanghai Stock Exchange. The Non-state-owned enterprises sample consists 14,379 firm-year 
observations. 
 
SOEs Non-SOEs 
Variable Mean Median SD Mean Median SD 
Book leverage 0.47  0.48  0.20  0.48  0.48  0.19  
Market leverage 0.25  0.15  0.26  0.21  0.10  0.24  
Book leverage 
(Bank Loans) 
0.18 0.16 0.15 0.20 0.19 0.15 
Book leverage  
(Trade Debt) 
0.18  0.14  0.14  0.15  0.12  0.11  
Book leverage  
(Corporate Bonds) 
0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.03 
Firm size  
(Book Assets) 
2.42E+10 2.84E+09 1.74E+11 5.75E+09 1.74E+09 2.47E+10 
Market-to-book ratio 13.29  2.74  54.79  14.07  4.29  39.57  
ROA 2.62  1.12  5.55  2.72  0.89  11.59  
Tangibility 0.28  0.25  0.19  0.25  0.22  0.17  
Dividend payer 0.33  0.24  0.52  0.33  0.24  0.53  
Obs. 993  14379  
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Table 3-10 Impact of Initial Leverage on Future Leverage Base on State-ownership 
Table 3-10 reports the results of panel OLS regressions of book leverage on 1-year lagged time-varying factors and firms’ initial leverage based on 
state-ownership, I can observe the impact of initial leverage on future leverage for SOEs and Non-SOEs in column (a) and (d). In column (b), (c) and 
(e), (f), I add some time-varying factors like firm size, market-to-book ratio etc.. 
Variable 
 SOEs   Non-SOEs  
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Initial leverage 0.53*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.56*** 0.50*** 0.49*** 
 (13.86) (11.27) (11.25) (38.71) (31.15) (30.53) 
Firm size   0.03*** 0.03***  0.03*** 0.03*** 
  (5.06) (5.12)  (13.76) (14.72) 
Market-to-book ratio  -0.0003*** -0.0003***  -0.00007*** -0.00006*** 
  (-1.79) (-1.78)  (-1.02) (-0.81) 
ROA  0.0002*** 0.00004***  0.0003*** 0.0004*** 
  (0.13) (0.03)  (1.64) (2.21) 
Tangibility  -0.05*** -0.05***  -0.005*** -0.0003*** 
  (-1.37) (-1.42)  (-0.34) (-0.02) 
Dividend payer   -0.01
***   -0.03*** 
   (-0.93)   (-6.37) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Adj.R2 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.24 0.23 0.24 
       
Obs. 993 993 993 14,379 14,379 14,379 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3-11 Panel Regression with Firm Fixed Effects Base on State-ownership 
Table 3-11 reports the results of panel OLS regressions of book leverage on firm fixed effects and other traditional determinants. Column (a) and (h) 
report that if the model only contains firm fixed effect, column (b) and (i) replace firm fixed effect with year fixed effect, column (c) and (j) report if 
the model contains both firm fixed effect and year fixed effect. And column (d) (e) (f) (g) and (k) (l) (m) (n) add several traditional determinants. 
Variable 
SOEs Non-SOEs 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) 
Firm fixed effect 
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 
              
Year fixed effect 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
               
Firm size - - - 0.03
*** 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.06*** - - - 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 
 
   (5.80) (5.86) (5.87) (5.96)    (18.21) (18.59) (19.47) (18.42) 
Market-to-book ratio - - - -0.0005
* -0.0002 -0.0005* -0.0002 - - - -0.0001 -0.00002 -0.00009 -0.00001 
    (-2.51) (-1.25) (-2.49) (-1.22)    (-1.82) (-0.37) (-1.42) (-0.29) 
ROA 
- - - 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 - - - 0.0006** 0.00002 0.0007*** -0.00001 
    (1.73) (-1.53) (1.82) (-1.46)    (2.79) (0.09) (3.46) (-0.08) 
Tangibility - - - -0.13*** 0.18*** -0.13*** 0.19*** - - - -0.005 0.07*** -0.02 0.07 
    (-3.68) (3.65) (-3.73) (3.84)    (-0.37) (4.27) (-1.05) (4.46) 
Dividend payer 
- - - - - -0.01 -0.02 - - - - - -0.05*** 0.02 
 
   - - (-1.01) (-1.68)    - - (-8.44) (3.88) 
Adj.R2 0.55 0.03 0.60  0.08 0.65 0.08 0.65 0.52 0.05 0.58  0.10 0.61 0.11 0.61 
Obs. 993 14,379 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 3-1 Average Leverage of Actual Leverage Portfolio in Event Time 
Figure 3-1 was calculated following the empirical research of LRZ (2008). First, in each calendar 
year, according to their current leverage ratio, I sort firms into quartiles (i.e., four portfolios: highest, 
high, low and lowest). The portfolio formation year is denoted event year 0. Second, I calculate the 
average leverage for each portfolio in each of the subsequent 10 years, holding the portfolio 
composition constant (but for firms that exit the sample, through bankruptcy, acquisitions or 
buyouts). The surrounding dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. I perform the similar 
calculation for both book leverage and market leverage in Panel A and B of Figure 3-1 respectively. 
Panel C corresponds to a graph of the subsample of firms existing for at least 10 years (10 year 
survivors). 
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Figure 3-2 Average Leverage of Unexpected Leverage Portfolio in Event Time 
Each calendar year, first, I estimate a cross-sectional regression of leverage on 1-year lagged factors 
that have been discussed by the previously literatures, in equation (1), these relevant determinants 
of capital structure include firm size, profitability, market-to-book, tangibility and dividend payer. 
Second, I sort firms into four portfolios based on the residuals from the above regression, which I 
term “unexpected leverage,” and then calculate the average actual leverage of each portfolio over 
the subsequent 10 years. By estimating the regression from 1994 to 2016, I enable to control the 
marginal effect of traditional factors over time. 
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Figure 3-3 Extent of Cross-sectional Leverage Stability 
Figure 3-3 presents the average R2 for adjacent-year leverage cross-sections, the horizontal axis 
denotes when I calculate the pairs of correlation coefficients, the number of years between cross 
sections. The vertical axis reports the adjusted average square correlation coefficient that differ by 
T years. Confidence intervals (two standard error bands in dashes) are calculated by bootstrap 
procedure, resampling with replacement the individual squared correlations for each value of T, 
and using 1,000 sample replications. 
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Figure 3-4 Evolution of Portfolios Sorted According to Loan Ratio and Trade Debt 
In each calendar year, according to their current bank loans ratio (trade debt), I sort firms into 
quartiles. The portfolio formation year is denoted event year 0. And then, I calculate the bank loans 
ratio (trade debt) for each portfolio in each of the subsequent 10 years, holding the portfolio 
composition constant. Finally, I repeat the same calculation for every year in the sample period. 
The surrounding dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.  
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Figure 3-5 Average Leverage of Unexpected Bank Loans and Trade Debt Portfolios  
Each calendar year, I estimate a cross-sectional regression of leverage on 1-year lagged 
determinants such as firm size, ROA, market-to-book ratio, tangibility and dividend payer. And 
then, I sort firms into four portfolios based on the residuals from the above regression, which I term 
“unexpected leverage,” and then calculate the average actual leverage of each portfolio over the 
subsequent 10 years.  
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Figure 3-6 Extent of Cross-sectional Leverage Stability Based on Bank Loans and Trade Debt 
Panel A and B of Figure 3-6 present the average R2 for adjacent-year leverage cross-sections based 
on bank loans and trade debt, respectively. The horizontal axis denotes when I calculate the pairs 
of correlation coefficients, the number of years between cross sections. The vertical axis reports 
the adjusted average square correlation coefficient that differ by T years. Confidence intervals (two 
standard error bands in dashes) are calculated by bootstrap procedure, resampling with replacement 
the individual squared correlations for each value of T, and using 1,000 sample replications. 
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Figure 3-7 Average Leverage of Actual Leverage Portfolios based on state-ownership 
Each calendar year, according to their current leverage ratio, I sort firms into quartiles. And then I 
calculate the average leverage for each portfolio in each of the subsequent 10 years, holding the 
portfolio composition constant. Finally, I repeat the same calculation for every year in the sample 
period. This process generates 23 sets of event-time averages, one for each calendar year in the 
sample (from 1994 to 2016). The surrounding dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. I 
perform the similar calculation for both SOEs in Panel A and Non-SOEs in Panel B of Figure 3-7 
respectively. 
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4. Banks’ Use of Credit Guarantee 
4.1. Introduction 
Credit guarantees are a type of guarantees that a guarantor provides on loans to corporate 
borrowers underwritten by financial institutions. In return for obtaining a fee in advance, the 
guarantor makes the repayment for the borrower, if a borrower cannot make a promised repayment 
and the loan defaults. Many countries around the world provide public credit guarantee programs 
by the governments to facilitate loans by private financial institutions to firms that have difficulty 
in raising funds, especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Beck, Klapper, and 
Mendoza 2010). Also, credit guarantee programs are extensively used to cope with the financial 
crisis. For instance, 19 out of 23 OECD member countries employed or enhanced their credit 
guarantee schemes following the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (Uesugi, Sakai, and 
Yamashiro 2010).  
As predicted by theoretical studies (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, Mankiw 1986, Gale 1990, 1991), 
the promotion of loan provision by private lenders under asymmetric information is the most 
important expected benefit of credit guarantee programs. However, the theory also suggests that 
the benefit might accompany inefficiencies, and the most significant concern is a promotion of 
underwriting unprofitable loans by banks (de Meza and Webb 1987 and de Meza 2002). For banks, 
guaranteed loans are safer than non-guaranteed loans, so banks might provide guaranteed loans 
even if they recognize that the likelihood of repayment is small and would not otherwise (i.e., 
without guarantee) provide loans. Also, banks might have smaller incentive to screen and monitor 
loans if they are guaranteed. Furthermore, guaranteed loans are more preferable to non-guaranteed 
loans for banks because the risk weight of guaranteed loans for regulatory capital ratios is smaller. 
Thus, the willingness to use credit guarantee might differ across banks, especially when they have 
low capital ratios.  
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Behind this background, this section examines the difference in the usage of guaranteed loans 
among banks. I use data from a corporate survey, the “Survey on Current Situation of Corporate 
Finance in Japan,” conducted in Japan from October to November 2010, construct a unique firm-
bank matched dataset, and compare the ratio of guaranteed loans to total loans at the firm-bank 
level. The most significant advantage of this dataset is that for each responding firm, information 
on two loans from two different banks is available: one from the bank that lends the largest amount 
of loans to the firm (the largest lender) and the other from the bank that lends the second largest. 
Using this information, I can control for firm fixed effects a la Khwaja and Mian (2008) using 
individual firm dummies. Due to this control, I eliminate the effects of borrower characteristics, or 
loan demand factors. I can also eliminate the effects of guarantors’ characteristics, or guarantee 
supply factors, because the location of the borrower determines the guarantor, from one of the 51 
public Credit Guarantee Corporations in Japan. I can thus extract the difference in the ratio of 
guaranteed loans within firm and across banks, as the so-called fixed effect estimator (Khwaja and 
Mian 2008). This, remaining difference is solely due to factors on the supply side of loans.  
In the regression analysis, I use two specifications. In the first of our specifications, the bank 
fixed effect regression. I regress the ratio of guaranteed loans on bank fixed effects after controlling 
for firm fixed effects. Through this specification, I examine whether there are significant 
differences in the usage of guaranteed loans across banks. In the second specification, the financial 
indicator regression, I use banks’ financial indicators instead of using the bank fixed effect and 
examine whether any difference in the guarantee ratio across banks stems from differences in banks’ 
financial conditions. In this specification, I use four financial indicators as main independent 
variables: regulatory capital ratio, return on asset (ROA), non-performing loans (NPL) ratio, and 
bank size. 
The results show that there is a significant difference in the usage of guaranteed loans across 
banks. The results from the bank fixed effect regression show that after controlling for the loan 
demand and guarantee supply factors, there remain non-negligible differences in the ratio of 
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guaranteed loans to total loans across banks. From the financial indicator regression, I find that 
banks with lower profitability tend to use more guaranteed loans. However, the statistical 
significance of this effect is small, and other financial indicators, especially the regulatory capital 
ratio for banks, are insignificant. These findings imply that the difference in the usage of guaranteed 
loans across banks are partly due to their different financial conditions, but other non-financial 
differences across banks matter more.  
The main contribution of this section is in its extraction of the difference in the usage of credit 
guarantees across banks that purely stem from differences across banks. There are many empirical 
studies on public credit guarantees, but most of them focus on the relation between the use of credit 
guarantees and the ex-post characteristics of borrowers.19 However, there are few papers on the 
use of guarantees from the viewpoint of the lenders. To the best of my knowledge, it is the first to 
take advantage of the strong identification using the fixed effect estimator.  
  The rest of the part is composed as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the previous empirical 
literature. I explain our data and the methodology in section 4.3. In section 4.4, I report and discuss 
the results. Section 4.5 concludes this section. 
4.2. Existing evidence on credit guarantee 
There have been many empirical studies on public credit guarantee programs, and the academic 
interest is recently increasing. The primary focus in many studies is on whether or not the programs 
increase credit availability of potential borrowers, or fill the “funding gap” (also referred to as 
“incrementality” or “additionality”) (Cowling 1998, Cowling and Mitchell 2003, Riding and 
Haines 2001, Cowling 2010, Riding, Madill, and Haines 2007, Zecchini and Ventura 2009, Boschi, 
Girardi, and Ventura 2014). To examine whether the increased availability is efficient or not, many 
studies also examine the ex-post performance of the borrowers of guaranteed loans such as their 
                                                             
19 See section 4.2 for the prior empirical studies. 
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profitability and riskiness, or real outcomes such as employment and productivity (Riding and 
Haines 2001, Boocock and Shariff 2005, Kang and Heshmati 2008, Oh, Lee, Heshmati, and Choi 
2009, Craig, Jackson, and Thomson 2007, Brown and Earle 2017, Mullins and Toro 2017, and Lee 
2018).  
There are some studies on these issues using data from Japan. Examining the effect of the Special 
Credit Guarantee Program for Financial Stability (1998–2001), which is an emergency 100% 
guarantee program to help SMEs after the banking crisis in Japan, Uesugi, Sakai and Yamashiro 
(2010) find that the program significantly increased credit availability of borrowers, and the 
borrowers, especially low-risk firms, became more efficient. Consistent with these findings, Wilcox 
and Yasuda (2008) find that the benefit was larger for the first-time users of the program. However, 
later study on the Emergency (Safety-Net) Credit Guarantee Program, which is another emergency 
100% guarantee program implemented after the Global Financial Crisis, find that the improved 
credit availability accompanies poorer ex-post performance of borrowers and a portfolio 
substitution by the borrower’s main banks away from non-guaranteed loans to guaranteed loans 
(Ono, Uesugi, and Yasuda 2013).  
Compared with much interest in borrowers’ outcomes in these studies, there is relative scarcity 
of research on the behavior of lenders, or how they use credit guarantees and whether there is a 
moral hazard or adverse selection problems on lenders’ side. Saito and Tsuruta (2018) examine the 
association between default rates of borrowers and their ratio of guaranteed loans to total loans to 
answer whether banks provide loans to high risk borrowers, and find affirmative evidence. Wilcox 
and Yasuda (2008) and Ono, Uesugi, and Yasuda (2013) examine the relation between guaranteed 
and non-guaranteed loans to examine their substitution or complementarity. Different from these 
papers, I directly examine whether the ratio of guaranteed loans depends on lender characteristics.  
The study that is methodologically closest to mine is Hancock and Wilcox (1998). They examine 
the effects of banks’ financial variables on different financial and real economic activities at the 
state level in the U.S., and one of their dependent variables is the amount of credit guarantees. They 
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find no significant effect of the variables. Different from this paper, I use data at the firm-bank level, 
and control for the firm fixed effect to exclude effects from any unobservable (and observable) 
borrower-specific factors. This approach allows us to extract the difference in the usage of credit 
guarantee solely due to lender-specific factors. 
4.3. Data and Methodology 
4.3.1. Credit guarantee programs in Japan 
Credit Guarantee Corporations (CGCs), government-affiliated institutions established based on 
the Credit Guarantee Corporation Law, provide guarantees on loans to SMEs in Japan.20 There are 
51 CGCs in Japan (47 prefecture-level corporations and 4 city-level ones) that provide guarantees 
to borrowers in the respective areas. The outstanding amount of liabilities guaranteed by the 
corporations is 35.1 trillion yen at the end of March 2011, and 23.9 trillion yen at the end of March 
2017 (Japan Federation of Credit Guarantee Corporations 2012, 2017). 
Historically, the CGCs had provided guarantees by assuming all the credit risk of lenders, i.e., 
they had provided 100% guarantees only. However, due to concerns for reduced screening and 
monitoring incentives for lenders under the 100% guarantee, the 2007 program reform reduced the 
coverage to 80% (the so-called Responsibility-Sharing scheme). However, there remained some 
“exceptional” 100% guarantee programs, including the massive Emergency (Safety-Net) Credit 
Guarantee Program from 2008 to respond to the Global Financial Crisis and the Great East Japan 
Earthquake Recovery Emergency Guarantee Program from 2011 to respond to the Great Tohoku 
Earthquake. 
In this section, I use data obtained from a corporate survey conducted in the fall of 2010. Among 
                                                             
20 The guaranteed liabilities associated with the loans are (re)insured by the Japan Finance Corporation’s Small and 
Medium Enterprise Unit. See Nitani and Riding (2005) and Japan Federation of Credit Guarantee Corporations (2017) 
for more institutional background behind the credit guarantee programs in Japan.  
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the 35.1 trillion yen of the outstanding amount of guaranteed loans at the end of March 2011, 17.7 
trillion yen (50.5%) is of the Emergency Credit Guarantee Program (100% guarantee), 6.1 trillion 
yen (17.5%) is of the other 100% guarantee programs, and the responsibility-sharing 80% guarantee 
accounts for 11.2 trillion yen (32.0%).21  Unfortunately, I have no information in my data to 
breakdown the amount of guaranteed loans based on whether they are 100% or 80% guarantees. 
4.3.2. Dataset and data selection 
The data used in this study are collected from the Survey of Corporate Finance in Japan, which 
are conducted in the period from October to November 2010. The questionnaire was sent to 13,579 
target firms that were selected from the database of Tokyo Shoko Research (TSR), one of the largest 
business credit information providers in Japan.22 Among the 13,579 firms, 2,703 firms respond 
(response rate of 19.9%). The survey consists of six parts: “Company Profile”, “Financial 
Transaction between Companies and Bank”, “Defaulting on Loans and Related Bank”, 
“Supervision”, “Policy” and “Credit Guarantee”.23 
The top three industries of responding firms are Construction (57.9%), Manufacturing (12.2%) 
and Wholesale (9.7%). Most of them (61.7%) are firms established more than 30 years ago, and 
68.7% of them have 20 employees or less. More than 60% of the responding firms utilize credit 
guarantee (64.9%), where 43.8% of the firms utilize credit guarantee for more than 10 years.24  
                                                             
21 These figures are obtained from a document presented at the 7th meeting (May 31, 2017) of the Finance Working 
Group, the Council for Small and Medium Enterprise Policy, the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency of the 
Government of Japan (available in Japanese at: http://www.chusho.meti.go.jp/koukai/shingikai/kihonmondai/2016/ 
download/160531kihonmondai3.pdf) (checked on June 5, 2018). 
22 The TSR database has been used by the SME Agency of the Government of Japan for their annual issues of the 
White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises. The selection criteria for the 13,579 firms are: (i) firms that have financial 
statements that are available from TSR for fiscal 2007 and 2009, and (ii) firms that have transactions with one of the pre-
specified 286 regional financial institutions (31 regional banks, 183 Shinkin banks, and 72 credit cooperatives). These 
are the criteria to obtain data suitable for research other than the present one. 
23 Studies using data from this survey include Hattori, Shintani, and Uchida (2015) and Nakaoka, Takada, and 
Uchida (2017). 
24 For more information on the characteristics of the responding firms, see Nakaoka, Uchida, and Yamori (2011a, b). 
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4.3.3. Guarantee ratio and firm fixed effects 
The main variable is the credit guarantee ratio defined as the ratio of the amount of guaranteed 
loans to the total loans. The survey contains questions that enable us to measure the ratio at the 
firm-bank level. Specifically, each respondent firm answers the amount of loans obtained during 
2009 from the banks that lend the most (the largest lender) and the second most (the second largest 
lender), together with the amount of guaranteed loans from the respective banks. I can thus calculate 
two guarantee ratios per firm, one for the largest lender and another for the second largest lender. 
Because not all responding firms answer the relevant questions, the number of observation is 
smaller than two times the number of the responding firms. I have 802 observations for the 
guarantee ratio at the firm-bank level.  
In my regression analysis, I use the credit guarantee ratio as the dependent variable, and regress 
it on bank variables as well as firm fixed effects by simple OLS. The advantage of using these data 
is that I can control for the firm fixed effects despite that they are cross-sectional data. Among the 
802 observations, 430 are for firms with 2 observations (i.e., for 215 firms). For these observations, 
I can use respective firm dummies to control for the firm fixed effects. To check the robustness of 
our results, I run the regression for the sample of 802 observations as well as the subsample of 430 
observations. 
 
< Insert Table 4-1 here > 
 
Table 4-1 reports descriptive statistics for dependent variables for 802 and 430 observations, 
together with those for bank financial indicators explained below. As for the full sample of 802 
observations, the mean value of the guarantee ratio is 7.8%, but the ratio ranges from 0% to 100%. 
The mean ratio is higher than that for the subsample with two observations per firms, which is 5.3%.  
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4.3.4. Bank variables 
4.3.4.1. Bank fixed effects 
In my first specification, I use bank fixed effects as our main independent variables, and examine 
whether there are significant differences in the usage of guaranteed loans across banks. I can 
identify 260 different banks for 802 firm-bank observations. However, because some of these banks 
lend only to one firm, I can use 178 bank dummies for this sample, which I label as 
bank_dummy_2_1 through bank_dummy_2_178. For a robustness checks, I alternatively focus on 
banks lending to 5 or more firms. There are 47 such banks, for which I create dummy variables 
bank_dummy_5_1 through bank_dummy_5_47. When I use the subsample for firms with more 
than 2 observations (430 observations), the number of dummies for banks lending to more than 1 
firm decreases to 95, and that for banks lending to more than 4 firms decrease to 17.  
After obtaining the bank fixed effects as estimated coefficients for these bank dummies, I sort 
them out in the order of their magnitudes and depict them in a figure. To examine whether the 
differences in the effects are statistically significant, I also perform t-tests for the null hypothesis 
of the coefficients for each bank being the same as the coefficient for the largest coefficient, or the 
smallest one. 
4.3.4.2. Bank financial indicator regression 
As an alternative specification, I use bank financial indicators as my main independent variables. 
This specification is to examine whether any significant difference in the guarantee ratio across 
banks stems from differences in banks’ financial conditions. Specifically, I use banks’ regulatory 
capital ratio, ROA, non-performing loan (NPL) ratio, and asset size. The data sources for these 
variables are banks’ financial statements obtained through the Nikkei Financial Quest Database 
(Nikkei Inc.) and the Financial Statements of Credit Cooperatives in Japan (Kin-yu Tosho 
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Consultant Sha). I match the survey data and the financial statement data using the names of the 
firms’ largest and the second largest lenders that the responding firms identified in the survey. The 
bank regulatory capital ratio is available from the banks’ financial statements. I define bank ROA 
as the ratio of current profit to total asset, bank NPL ratio as the ratio of risk management loans to 
total loans, and bank size as the natural logarithm of total asset. Because the financial statement 
data are not available for a small number of banks, I have 788 observations of these indicators for 
the whole sample, and 412 observations for firms with 2 observations.  
Table 4-1 shows the descriptive statistics for the financial indicators. The mean regulatory capital 
ratio of our sample firms is 12.5%. For an average bank, ROA is 0.2%, the NPL ratio is 4.5%, and 
the asset size is 7.1 trillion yen. For the subsample of two observations per firm, capital ratio, ROA, 
and NPL ratio are comparable. However, the guarantee ratio is lower than the corresponding figures 
for the full sample. 
4.4. Results 
4.4.1. Results for bank fixed effect regression 
Figure 4-1 reports the results for the bank fixed effect regression. In four panels of this figure, I 
plot the value of the coefficients for the bank dummies in the order of their magnitudes. Panels A 
and B are for the result using dummies for banks lending to more than 1 firms (bank_dummy_2_1 
through bank_dummy_2_178), while panels C and D are for the results using dummies for banks 
lending to more than 4 firms (bank_dummy_5_1 through bank_dummy_5_47). The sample for 
panels A and C are with full 802 observations, while the sample for panels B and D are with 430 
observations of firms with 2 observations. As explained above, the numbers of banks (or bars) in 
panels A, B, C, and D are respectively 178, 95, 47 and 17. 
 
<Insert Figure 4-1 here> 
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As shown in panel A, the coefficients for 178 bank_dum_2 dummies ranges from less than -0.2 
to around 0.8. More specifically, the relevant regression result shows that the coefficients for the 
bank dummies is -0.279 at the minimum and 0.758 at the maximum. The t-tests for the differences 
in the coefficients indicate that the most significant coefficient (0.758) is statistically different from 
all but one coefficient that is smaller than 0.40, and the largest coefficient (-0.279) is different from 
all coefficients that are larger than 0.180, both at the 10% level of statistical significance. However, 
the difference between the maximum and the minimum coefficients being larger than 1 is difficult 
to economically interpret, because the maximum value of the actual ratio of guaranteed loans does 
not exceed 1. There is also a concern for this specification due to insufficient power of controlling 
for firm fixed effects, because I have no firm dummies for 372 (= 802 - 430) observations. 
The range for the coefficients for the bank dummies narrows in panel B. The regression results 
show that the minimum is -0.360 and the maximum is 0.443. The t-tests for the difference between 
the maximum or the minimum and each coefficient show that the maximum coefficient (0.443) is 
statistically different from the coefficients with the value smaller than 0.1, and the minimum (-
0.360) is statistically different from the coefficients taking the value larger than -0.1 with some 
exceptions (both at the 10% level of statistical significance). 
When I use dummies for banks that lend to more than 4 firms, the range of the coefficient values 
is from -0.149 to 0.225 for the full sample of 802 observations (panel C), and from -0.0564 to 
0.0756 for the subsample of firms with 2 observations (panel D). There is a statistically significant 
difference between the maximum and the minimum in panel C. however, the relevant difference is 
statistically insignificant in panel D. I also need to take into account the fact that the numbers of 
banks shown in these panels are small because of the lower number of banks lending to more than 
4 firms (especially only 17 for panel D). 
To visually compare the results in the four panels of Figure 4-1, I integrate them in Figure 4-2. 
In this figure, I keep the order of banks in panel A and add the corresponding coefficients for the 
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relevant banks, where available, in panels B through D. I can see that the order of the coefficients 
is not consistent across the four panels. However, I should note that the number of banks is different 
across four panels. In particular, banks with larger coefficients in panel A are not included in panels 
B through D. Although it is difficult to make a clear conclusion, at least I can conclude that there 
is a significant difference in the ratio that solely due to factors on the lenders’ side.  
 
<Insert Figure 4-2 here> 
 
4.4.2. Results for bank financial indicator regression 
Table 4-2 reports the result for the bank financial indicator regression. The results show that the 
effects of most financial indicators on the usage of guaranteed loans is statistically insignificant. 
However, I find that banks with lower profitability, measured by ROA, tend to use more guaranteed 
loans. This finding suggests that banks with poor screening or monitoring ability tend to rely more 
on guaranteed loans that are safer than non-guaranteed loans. However, the effect is statistically 
weak, and is significant only at the 10% level. These findings suggest that a difference in banks’ 
financial conditions to some extent explains the difference in different usage of guaranteed loans 
across banks, but much of the difference across banks that I find in the bank fixed effect regression 
stem from factors other than banks’ financial conditions.  
 
<Insert Table 4-2 here> 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
This section investigates whether and why the use of guaranteed loans differs across banks by 
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using data at the firm-bank level from Japan. After controlling for loan demand and guarantee 
supply factors by using fixed effect estimator a la Khwaja and Mian (2008), I find a significant 
difference in the ratio of guaranteed loans to total loans across banks. I also find that the difference 
partly stems from a difference in banks’ profitability, but there remains a significant difference that 
cannot be explained by differences in banks’ financial conditions. 
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Table 4-1 Basic Statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics for our main variables. Guarantee ratio is the ratio of guaranteed loans to total loans. I have 802 
observations for this variable, but when I limit the sample to firm with 2 observations only, we have 430 observations. The remaining 
variables are bank financial indicators. Bank regulatory capital ratio is the capital ratio of the Basel standard for banks operating 
internationally, and of the domestic standard for the others. Bank ROA is the ratio of current profit to total asset. Bank NPL ratio is the ratio 
of risk management loans to total loans. Bank size is the natural logarithm of total asset. Because the financial statement data are not available 
for a small number of bank, we have 788 observations of these indicators for the whole sample, and 412 observations for firms with 2 
observations.  
  Full Sample Sub Sample 
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max. Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Guarantee rate 802 0.0775942 0.2380219 0 1 430 0.0534571 0.1897119 0 1 
Bank regulatory capital 
ratio 
788 12.51558 5.281816 4.65 65.15 412 12.36113 4.532758 4.65 65.15 
Bank ROA 788 0.0021435 0.0020028 0.0001662 0.0284747 412 0.0021042 0.0017413 0.0001662 0.0248447 
Bank NPL ratio 788 0.0452188 0.0330638 0 0.274761 412 0.0407394 0.0321472 0 0.274761 
Bank size 788 7176719 2.50e+07 23517 1.54e+08 412 9020003 2.84e+07 55576 1.54e+08 
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Table 4-2 Bank Financial Indicators Regression 
This table reports the result for the bank financial indicator regression. The dependent variable is 
Guarantee ratio, the ratio of guaranteed loans to total loans. The independent variables are the four 
financial indicators of banks defined in Table 4-1 and the firm-fixed effects. 
 
Dependent variables 
 (1) Full Sample (2) Sub Sample 
Independent variable Guarantee ratio Guarantee ratio 
Bank capital ratio 
 
Bank ROA 
 
Bank NPL ratio 
 
Bank size 
 
Firm fixed effects 
Constant 
 
Observations 
R-squared 
-0.000861 
 
4.496 
 
0.480 
 
0.0101 
 
Yes 
-0.0635 
 
788 
0.314 
-0.000277 
 
-3.719* 
 
0.394 
 
0.00642 
 
Yes 
-0.0986 
 
412 
0.853 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Figure 4-1 Bank fixed effects 
This figure reports the results for the bank fixed effect regression, where I plot the values of the 
coefficients for the bank dummies in the order to their magnitudes. Panels A and C are the result 
using the whole sample, while panels B and D are the results using the subsample of firms with 
more than 2 observations. In panels A and B, I use the dummies for banks that lend to 2 or more 
firms, while in panels C and D, I use the dummies for banks that lend to 5 or more firms. 
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Figure 4-2 Bank fixed effects (All specifications in one figure) 
This figure combines the results in the four panels of Figure 4-1. Based on the results in panel A, I add the corresponding coefficients for 
the relevant banks, where available, from panels B through D. 
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5. Conclusion 
5.1. Summary 
This paper examines debt financing with public involvement by using Chinese and Japanese 
dataset. In the analysis, there are three issues are considered: debt structure choice in Chinese listed 
SMEs; long-term stability of the capital structure of Chinese listed firms; banks’ use of credit 
guarantee by using Japanese survey data. 
For debt structure, whether or not credit rating is a crucial determinant when they choose the 
optimal debt choice. The result shows that if a firm has the credit rating, it can borrow from a 
commercial bank more easily and tend to issue public bonds in the market. The other important 
determinant is the firm’s ownership. If a firm is a state-owned enterprise, it is more difficult to lend 
bank loans. The result is inconsistent with previous findings or our intuition. The possible reasons 
may be from China’s financial reform that began in 2004 or intervention by local governments.  
I find that big firms tend to issue bonds or lend from non-bank financial institutions, and small 
firms use more bank loans. Younger firms prefer the public debt, but firm age is not significantly 
related to other funds. Also, the non-bank private debt is the dominant source of debt structure for 
Chinese SMEs. The findings show that it is negatively related to the firm’s credit rating, fixed assets 
and leverage, and positively associated with firm size, and the result is statistically significant. 
Regarding debt stability, the results show that firms’ cross-sectional leverage exhibit remarkable 
convergence, and long-term stability. Firms with relatively high (low) leverage still have leverage 
close to their initial leverage portfolios. In the regression analysis, I test the effects of the traditional 
determinants of debt structure and firms’ initial leverage. The result shows that initial leverage has 
a stronger impact on future leverage than traditional time-varying determinants. 
The further analyses of debt stability investigate the stability of debt structure and firms’ 
ownership. The findings show that the bank loans and trade debt may drive the long-term stability, 
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and non-SOEs also exhibit stability and convergence among the most portfolio average leverage 
classes over time. However, the low and lowest leverage of SOEs changed frequently, especially in 
the last years.  
Last, I investigate how banks’ use of credit guarantee when they lend, using data from Japan at 
the firm-bank level from a corporate survey conducted in the fall of 2010. By controlling for loan 
demand factors and guarantee supply factors using the fixed effect estimator, this part finds 
significant differences in the usage of credit guarantee loans. I also find that the differences partly 
stem from a difference in banks’ profitability. However, other financial indicators, especially the 
regulatory capital ratio for banks, are insignificant.  
5.2. Discussion and Implication 
The paper analyzes the behavior of both borrowers and lenders in debt financing with public 
involvement by using Chinese and Japanese dataset. I find that firms’ debt choice and long-term 
stability are significantly affected by their ownership, and the usage of credit guarantee is 
substantial across banks. Although it is difficult to obtain a decisive conclusion, this study clarified 
some new evidence on public involvement in debt financing. 
The empirical results of this study suggest that information asymmetry can explain Chinese firms’ 
choice of bank debt. However, the traditional theoretical models cannot interpret the persistence in 
leverage ratios. Previous studies imply the same assumption: the capital structure of the firm is 
instable because the traditional determinants are time-varying. My paper adds more evidence on 
the long-term stability of leverage, and firms’ initial leverage as the time-invariant component can 
explaining leverage stability. Some permanent time-invariant components are more critical than 
time-varying determinants. There are few theoretical models focus on this part. 
This study analyzes both debt structure and stability of SOEs. The results are not consistent with 
the previous studies or intuition that the government support SOEs, and they may finance more 
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easily from state-owned commercial banks. The debt structure of SOEs is not as stable as non-
SOEs, especially after China’s banking reform. After state-owned commercial banks transferred 
into “state holding share equity commercial banks”, SOEs face more difficult to obtain loans from 
the bank. 
Managers in SOEs is “double-status”. They are both business managers and political members. 
Thus, the target of the enterprise is not only focused on economic goals, such as profitability or 
scale but also satisfy some political tasks, for example, supporting local economies or education. 
Commercial banks cannot supervise and regulate SOEs effectively or independently. These banks 
may pay more attention to non-SOEs, especially after China’s banking reform. 
The prediction is confirmed again in debt stability analysis. The study finds that the debt stability 
of non-SOEs is more stable than SOEs. Stability of SOEs changes dramatically in the last several 
years, not as persistent as they exhibit before. Especially for low leverage. The finding suggests the 
reform of China’s banking system affects the leverage stability of SOEs, these firms especially poor 
repayment abilities of enterprises fluctuate significantly. 
In the analysis of credit guarantee scheme in Japan, I eliminate the effects of borrower 
characteristics or loan demand factors. And I also eliminate the effects of guarantors’ characteristics 
or guarantee supply factors. The findings show that a significant difference in the ratio of 
guaranteed loans to total loans across banks solely due to factors on the supply side of loans. 
However, it partly stems from a difference in banks’ profitability, and insignificant effects of other 
financial indicators mean that non-financial factors of banks matter more. 
5.3. Limitations and Future Research Implications 
This study has some limitations. First, in the debt structure analysis, I only focus on the listed 
firms, because financial indicator and other information from listed firms can be obtained. However, 
there are only a small number of total firms in China. The results merely reflect debt financing of 
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listed firms. Other unlisted firms have not been investigated. 
Second, in the future regression analysis, I will divide the sample into rated and unrated firms, 
and compare how these determinants of debt structure affect firms’ debt choice. Also, I test the 
traditional determinants and the time-invariant factor of debt structure and do not investigate firms’ 
industry, location, and other non-financial conditions. The Chinese government supports the 
development of high technology and biotechnology in recent year, firms in these industries grow 
more rapidly. And the imbalance of economic development in different regions may also affect 
firms’ debt structure or long-term stability. In the further research, I will add these permanent 
determinants. 
Third, regarding debt stability and state-ownership, the findings show that the leverage of SOEs 
frequently changed in the last several years. I discussed the reason for the instability of SOEs might 
come from China’s bank reform in 2004. In the future analysis, I will take exam whether or not the 
bank reform affects the evolution of leverage for SOEs by dividing the sample into before and after 
bank reform.  
Finally, regarding public involvement. I discuss the influence of firms’ state ownership and 
speculate that China’s bank reform may affect firms’ debt choice and stability. However, there is 
no empirical test for these speculations. A practical method is to separate the period into two parts: 
before and after the reform, and then do the same test to compare the two results. Moreover, in 
banks’ use of credit guarantee, there remains a significant difference that cannot be explained by 
differences in banks’ financial conditions. I will take into account more non-financial factors and 
bank type dummies in the further analysis. 
 
